Vol. 81, no. 4: Full Issue by Law Review, Denver University
Denver Law Review 
Volume 81 
Issue 4 Symposium - Post-9/11 Civil Rights Article 6 
December 2020 
Vol. 81, no. 4: Full Issue 
Denver University Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
81 Denv. U. L. Rev. (2004). 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please 
contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 




Published by the DENVER
University of Denver
College of Law UNIVERSITY
LAW
2004 Volume 81 Issue 4 REVIEW
CONTENTS
Forced Patriot Acts ...................................................... Alan K. Chen 703
Stolen Freedoms: Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians
in the Wake of Post 9/11 Backlash ...................... Dalia Hashad 735
How Far Have We Come Since
September 11 th, 2001? ....................................... Shawn Mitchell 749
Post 9/11 Civil Rights: Are Americans Sacrificing
Freedom for Security? .................. . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. Erwin Chemerinsky 759

FORCED PATRIOT ACTS
ALAN K. CHEN t
In the traumatic and emotionally disruptive period immediately fol-
lowing the September 11 th terrorist attacks, many Americans turned to a
variety of collective and individual expressions of patriotism as a source
of comfort t The nation's leading retailer reported that sales of American
flags skyrocketed.2 At many public events, people belted out patriotic
songs. Indeed, Commissioner Bud Selig decreed that major league base-
ball teams regularly broadcast God Bless America instead of Take Me
Out to the Ball Game during the seventh inning stretch.3 Red, white, and
blue bumper stickers bearing a variety of well-worn nationalist slogans
became ubiquitous.4 Public statements of unity such as these are a pre-
dictable and understandable response to the perception that the nation's
security is threatened, as people search for connection and certainty.
5
t Professor, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Case Western Reserve University,
1982; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1985. This essay was originally presented at a symposium on
March 5, 2004. Thanks to David Bogen, Erwin Chemerinsky, Richard Fallon, Stephen Feldman,
Abner Greene, Martin Katz, William Marshall, Julie Nice, Ann Scales, and Mark Tushnet for their
thoughtful comments on earlier iterations of this essay, to the Denver University Law Review staff
for organizing this symposium and inviting me to participate, and to students Suzanne Rauch and
Tara Dunn for sharing their thoughts about my symposium presentation. I am also grateful for the
outstanding research assistance of Jared Briant and Rhoda Hafiz, and for the extensive support of our
library's Faculty Services Liaison, Diane Burkhardt. In the interest of candor, I should disclose that I
have been legal counsel in some of the disputes discussed in this essay, including Lane v. Owens,
No. 03-B-1544 (PAC) (D. Colo.), see infra note 146, the "Dread" Scott Tyler flag art controversy,
see infra notes 127-37, and Aubin v. City of Chicago, No. 89 CH 8763 (Cook Co. Cir. Ct.), see infra
note 136. This essay is dedicated to my wife, Anne Ertman, a devoted public school teacher who
teaches students to think for themselves.
1. People also commonly turn to religion in such circumstances. For a thoughtful account of
the role and limits of public religious statements in times of crisis, see William P. Marshall, The
Limits of Securalism: Public Religious Expression in Moments of National Crisis and Tragedy, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11 (2002).
2. Debbie Howlett, Post-9/ll Flags Due for Repair, Replacements, USA TODAY, Mar. 28,
2002, at A3 (reporting that Wal-Mart's retail sales of United States flags for the two months follow-
ing September 11 th had risen ten-fold).
3. Jack Curry, Flags, Songs and Tears, and Heightened Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2001, at C 15. Teams were also given the option to play the song immediately prior to games. Id.
4. Jim Shea, Patriotic Buy Bumper Crop of Stickers, THE TIMES UNION, Oct. 29, 2001, at
C3.
5. One might offer another interpretation of these events as a reflection of Americans turning
to civil religion during a critical and unstable time. The controversial concept of an American civil
religion suggests that there is a common set of "beliefs, symbols, and rituals" to which Americans
adhere and relate in a manner analogous to, but distinct from, theistic religion. See Robert N. Bellah,
Civil Religion in America, in BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL
WORLD 175 (1970). As one commentator describes Bellah's visualization of this concept, "civil
religion provides a secular set of norms and values formerly shared by a society that was homogene-
ous and united religiously, economically, and socially." Alexandra D. Furth, Comment, Secular
Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Secularization Analysis, 146 U.
PENN. L. REV. 579, 597 (1998). Some modern commentators, however, have reinterpreted civil
religion to include aspects of sacral religion as well. Id. at 596. A complete consideration of the civil
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The government was not far behind. The United States House of
Representatives adopted a concurrent resolution of solidarity, encourag-
ing American citizens to display the United States flag for thirty days
after the attacks.6 Later in the year, the House designated September 11 th
as "Patriot Day."7 At the state and local level, lawmakers introduced nu-
merous measures designed to instill patriotic and nationalistic feelings
and promote civic education in children.8
While hortatory and symbolic measures ordinarily have little impact
on civil liberties, public officials did not confine their post-September
1lth responses to what we might call measures of comfort. In perhaps
the most predictable government response to the terrorist attacks, public
officials in many jurisdictions proposed, and in many cases adopted,
measures forcing individuals to participate in public acts of patriotism
without regard to those individuals' consciences or personal beliefs. Fo-
cusing on schoolchildren, these laws required students to publicly engage
in patriotic acts, such as flag salutes, exercises, and ritual recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance. 9
This type of governmental reaction to the terrorist attacks is consis-
tent with a cycle that has repeated itself throughout modem history. Over
at least the past century, a pattern has emerged in which the state repeat-
edly has responded to perceived national security fears with, among
other things, laws that force American citizens to demonstrate their loy-
alty by participating in public expressions of patriotism or refraining
from unpatriotic speech.
Legal scholars recently have reflected a great deal on the broader
civil liberties impact of government responses generated as part of the
post-September 1lth "war on terrorism."10 Their work has scrutinized
direct regulation of private conduct through measures such as the USA
PATRIOT Act," which are putatively designed to address terrorist
threats and other national security concerns. Some scholars assert that the
religion aspects of forced patriot acts is beyond the scope of this essay, but is surely worth incorpo-
rating into a broader discussion of the role of ceremonial nationalism in response to national crises.
6. 2001 House Concurrent Resolution 225 (Sept. 13, 2001).
7. 2001 House Concurrent Resolution 71 (Dec. 18, 2001).
8. John Gehring, States Weigh Bills to Stoke Students' Patriotism, EDUCATION WEEK, Mar.
27, 2002, at 19.
9. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(2) (2003) (removed from the statute in 2004); 24
PENN. STAT. § 7-771 (held unconstitutional by Circle Schools v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir.
2004)).
10. See, e.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in The War on Terror-
ism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003); Neal Devins, Congress, Civil Liberties, And The War on
Terrorism, II WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1139 (2003); Anthony Lewis, Civil Liberties in a Time of
Terror, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 257; Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liber-
ties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 273. For a pre-September 11 th account of the impact of war on
civil liberties, see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
(1998).
11. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
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severity of government reactions to national security crises diminishes
over time and with experience, or at least that such experience meaning-
fully alters the manner in which the government responds to contempo-
rary crises.' 2 This argument suggests that a form of "social learning" may
occur when later generations look back in hindsight at government over-
reactions to national security threats, thus reducing the possibility that
civil liberties violations will recur.'
3
No one has seriously examined forced patriotism laws in the wake
of September 1 lth or attempted to identify whether political, social, or
judicial reactions to such laws differ in any meaningful way from reac-
tions to more instrumental policy measures. In this essay, I describe the
historical pattern of forced patriotism laws and offer some explanations
for the recurring national impulse to adopt such laws. This impulse is
particularly curious in light of the fact that the unconstitutionality of such
measures has been unequivocally clear for more than half a century.' 4
The pattern is also unusual given our experience with such laws; while
lawmakers claim that these laws promote unity, these regulations have in
fact generated extraordinary divisiveness in American society. 15 I con-
clude that several factors distinguish forced patriotism laws from other
measures that impair civil liberties, making the former less susceptible to
the social learning that may occur in other areas.
I. THE CONCEPT OF FORCED PATRIOTISM
As with ll speech regulations, laws promoting forced patriotism
may operate in- one of two basic ways - by chilling expression or by
compelling it. In the first case, the government may adopt measures that
punish persons for engaging in expression deemed to be disloyal or to
undermine national unity. One needs only to look at the recent furor over
presidential candidate John Kerry's reported treatment of medals from
his service in Vietnam to understand the power of icons in American
culture. 16 Laws forbidding flag burning or other forms of flag desecration
are prototypical of this type of forced patriotism measure. Such laws
dictate silence where dissident expression would undermine patriotism or
respect for state-designated values or icons, yet do not advance, or even
12. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 10, at 287-90.
13. Id.
14. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
15. As just one example, the Supreme Court's first flag salute case upholding a mandatory
Pledge of Allegiance law, Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), led to waves of
horrific violence against Jehovah's Witnesses across the nation. PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF
THEIR CONVICTIONS 22-23 (1988); Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Bamette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 443-45 (Michael C. Dorf, ed., 2004) [hereinafter, Blasi & Shiffrin].
Although this tragic episode demonstrates the breadth of hostility towards dissenters, the federal
government did eventually take some action to compel state and local officials to address these
attacks. ROBERT GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA 283 (1978) [hereinafter,
GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION].
16. See Wesley K. Clark, Medals of Honor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at A21.
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purport to advance, security in any meaningful way. These regulations
could be described as "forced silence" patriotism laws.
More commonly, forced patriotism regulations appear in the form
of regulations compelling public affirmations of patriotism, loyalty, and
respect. Typical of these regulations are laws mandating that broad, un-
differentiated categories of persons take loyalty oaths, laws forcing indi-
viduals to salute or otherwise gesture in support of national icons such as
the United States flag, and laws directing individuals to recite or sing
patriotic texts, such as the Pledge of Allegiance or the National Anthem.
These measures might be labeled "forced speech" patriotism laws.
Both types of forced patriotism laws involve government efforts to
venerate symbols of nationalism and otherwise foster a sense of national
unity, as opposed to tangible measures, successful or not, to enhance
security. In this way, forced patriot acts are distinguishable from specific
policy initiatives that have been designed to protect the nation (e.g., in-
ternment, incarceration of activists who interfere with the draft), but have
resulted in other civil liberties threats that have haunted Americans.
When we look at laws that in one way or another compel patriotism, we
are focused on government efforts to manipulate symbols as opposed to
instrumentalist (or putatively instrumentalist) measures to address
threats. 17 As I discuss later, this distinction becomes important when we
examine the capacity for social learning about forced patriotism.
In terms of conventional free speech theory, both types of forced
patriotism laws implicate values central to the First Amendment's pro-
tection of expression.' 8 First, forced patriotism laws involve viewpoint
discrimination because they regulate persons with reference to their dis-
sident views. Forced silence patriotism laws censor those whose speech
is deemed to undermine national unity or convey disrespect.' 9 Similarly,
forced speech patriotism laws discriminate against those who do not
agree with the compulsory imposition of the government's prescribed
message. Those who agree with the mandatory recitation of the state's
script, and the corresponding compulsion of political orthodoxy, are un-
17. I am grateful to both Richard Fallon and Mark Tushnet for helping me to clarify this
important distinction.
18. U.S. CONST. amend I. It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the nuances of First
Amendment theory. For elaboration on such theory, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-1-12-2, at 785-94 (2d ed. 1988); LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT
SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); Thomas Scanlon, A
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-18 (1972); Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
19. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 413 n.9 (1989) ("[Slurely one's attitude toward
the flag and its referents is a viewpoint.").
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burdened by the law, whereas those who disagree with the state's mes-
sage (or agree with the message, but still wish to remain silent) may be
penalized for failing to comply.
20
The state's favoritism of patriotic, loyal viewpoints, in turn, com-
promises free speech values by distorting the composition of public dis-
course often described as the marketplace of ideas, thus portraying a
false sense of national unity. Moreover, censorship of dissent may have
implications for democracy and the possibilities of normal political
change. Electoral upheaval is unlikely where false perceptions of uni-
form public satisfaction are pervasive.
In addition to these considerations, forced speech patriotism laws
implicate distinct and independent free speech concerns. First, govern-
ment compulsion to speak a particular word or set of words implicates a
fundamental constitutional value because the First Amendment guaran-
tees individuals' right to refrain from speaking.2' One aspect of this
speech interest is to ensure that the speaker not be wrongly associated
with the government-prescribed message, which may not represent her
actual beliefs.22 On this account, the state offends the First Amendment
by forcing the speaker to act as the government's mouthpiece. The Court
endorsed constitutional protection of this interest in West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette,23 which invalidated a school board rule forcing
students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. As Justice Jackson wrote in
his majority opinion, "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. 24 This
20. See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943) ("[Llaws must, to be
consistent with the First Amendment, permit the widest toleration of conflicting viewpoints consis-
tent with a society of free men.").
21. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 18 (1986)
(invalidating regulation requiring utility company to include solicitations for reform organization
with its bills four times a year because it risked forcing the utility "to speak where it would prefer to
remain silent."); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (striking down state law forbidding
residents to cover up the message "Live Free or Die" on state-issued license plates); Barnette, 319
U.S. at 645 ("The right of freedom of thought ... as guaranteed by the Constitution against State
action includes both the right to speak freely and the fight to refrain from speaking at all, except in
so far as essential operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly soci-
ety." (Murphy, J., concurring)).
22. See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713-15. Some commentators question whether this value is
truly at stake in forced speech cases. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 433, 456.
[T]he mandatory recitation of the pledge did not require any individual to speak her mind
or to make any statement that even appeared to represent her thoughts as an individual
.... There is really scant risk here that a participant will be understood or misunderstood
as communicating her personal patriotism or her authentic pledge of allegiance.
Id.
Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 474 (1995) ("[S]o
long as the speech act is compelled and is known by a reasonable observer to be compelled, it would
be unreasonable for such an observer to view the message contained in the communication as neces-
sarily a revelation of the speaker's beliefs.").
23. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
24. Id. at 642.
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concern relates to what Jed Rubenfeld calls the "anti-orthodoxy princi-
ple," which suggests that it is simply not within the state's power to
mandate acceptable positions on issues of public importance. 5
A broader argument suggests that forced speech laws compromise
the right of autonomy rather than of pure speech. This understanding of
Barnette and its progeny asserts that forced speech laws fundamentally
interfere with individuals' internal deliberative processes more so than
the freedom to not speak. 26 As Professors Blasi and Shiffrin have re-
cently written:
Requiring potentially insincere recitation, and especially rote and pe-
riodic recitation, poses constitutional problems because it utilizes dis-
respectful methods of communication and persuasion. These methods
constitute efforts forcibly to inculcate and to instill rather than to per-
suade through direct, transparent arguments, reasons, or even direct,
transparent emotional appeals.
27
These autonomy-related ideals also find support in Barnette. There,
the Court recognized that "compelling the flag salute and pledge tran-
scends constitutional limitations" on local authorities' police powers and
that such forced patriotism laws invade "the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment ... to reserve from all
official control. 28
Notwithstanding the recognition of these foundational free speech
interests, the nation has repeatedly turned to forced patriotism measures
in response to perceived crises. A discussion of these cycles reveals a
historical pattern in which public officials have perpetuated the mistakes
of the past despite the clear constitutional barriers to the enforcement of
these laws.
II. NATIONAL INSECURITY - THE HISTORICAL CYCLES OF FEAR
As the historian Cecilia Elizabeth O'Leary has written, the tendency
toward nationalism in the United States is a relatively recent phenome-
25. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REv. 767, 818-21 (2001).
Another element of this interest in silence is maintaining the right to keep one's actual views from
being publicly disclosed. Greene, supra note 22, at 473 ("[Tlhe right not to speak is the right not to
reveal one's mind publicly."). This interest, however, is more likely implicated if one is forced to
express one's own views, rather than those from a government script. Accordingly, this is not an
important justification for invalidating forced speech patriotism laws.
26. TRIBE, supra note 18, at §15-5, at 1317 ("It is hard to take seriously the notion that those
who saw the license plate on the Maynard's car ... actually thought that the driver of the vehicle
endorsed the state's motto... The real problem ... is [that the law] 'invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit."' (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715)); Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 457 ("[Wlhat
underpins Barnette is the First Amendment interest in the speaker's freedom of thought and freedom
of conscience."); Greene, supra note 22, at 480-82 (arguing that compelled speech laws may be
viewed conceptually as violating constitutional rights of personhood and autonomy even if they do
not violate the right of free expression).
27. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 457-58.
28. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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non.29 Prior to the Civil War, there was much more affinity for regional
and statewide units than for a unified national polity.30 With some nota-
ble exceptions, there were few celebrations of nationalism or icons for
which respect was widely shared. Indeed, there was no National Anthem,
no Pledge of Allegiance, and no celebration of patriotic holidays other
than the Fourth of July. 31 Proponents and opponents of the temperance
movement adopted and parodied The Star-Spangled Banner, whose tune
was borrowed from an old English drinking song.32
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, the first wide-
spread efforts of private organizations to instill a sense of nationalism in
American culture emerged. In the 1880s, private patriotic groups began
organized campaigns to fortify nationalist sentiments, including promot-
ing daily recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance and other forms of re-
spect for the flag.3 3 Perhaps sparked by the Spanish-American War, the
first major international conflict in which the United States had engaged
since the war with Mexico, formal and informal efforts to instill patriot-
ism proliferated. Indeed, in 1898, on the day after war on Spain was de-
clared, the New York legislature adopted the first state flag salute law.34
Another factor in this development was the emergence of the first impor-
tant veterans' organization, the Grand Army of the Republic. 35 Also dur-
ing this period, Francis Bellamy wrote the original version of the Pledge
of Allegiance3 6 and pro-flag advocates founded the flag protection
movement, which enjoyed early success.37
Substantial government action to promote patriotism, however, did
not commence until World War 1.38 From World War I through the pre-
sent, there now have been six identifiable cycles of fear generated by
international conflict, threats to national security, or in one case, sheer
29. CECILIA ELIZABETH O'LEARY, To DIE FOR: THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN PATRIOTISM 10
(1999).
30. Id. That is not to say that related issues of nativism, xenophobia, and racism did not exist,
but those issues implicated slightly different concerns from the type of nationalism discussed here.
31. Id. at 3, 20.
32. Id. at 20-21 (noting that the anthem was "popular, but by no means sacred.").
33. Id. at 49.
34. IRONS, supra note 15, at 16. The law imposed a duty on the state school superintendent to
prepare a program providing for flag salutes at the beginning of every school day. DAVID
MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY 3 (1962). Typical of these
earlier flag laws, the New York statute did not formally compel students to participate, but the actual
practice effectively made such laws compulsory. Id. at 4.
35. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 29-48.
36. Id. at 160-62. Though different interpretations exist as to Bellamy's motivations, there is
at least some historical evidence that he had a financial interest in a flag producing business, and that
the Pledge may have been designed to boost sales. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 434 (citing
sources).
37. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, FLAG BURNING AND FREE SPEECH 20-21 (2000) [hereinafter,
GOLDSTEN, FLAG BURNING]; O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 232-33.
38. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 221.
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political will.39 Below, I briefly describe the forced patriotism measures
spawned by each of these cycles.4 °
A. The First Cycle: World War I, Espionage, and the First Red Scare
4 1
As students of First Amendment history are well aware, freedom of
speech first emerged as an important constitutional doctrine during the
period surrounding World War 1.42 At that time, Americans were con-
cerned with a number of different factors associated with the war. There
was strong domestic opposition to the United States's involvement in the
war, spurred in part by an emerging Socialist party that was gaining po-
litical influence.43 At the same time, the United States was concerned
about internal political strife in Russia and initial fears of domestic
Communism began to develop. 44 Coinciding with these events were
trepidations about the increasing immigrant population and the ascen-
dance of the labor movement.45 From these factors arose serious con-
cerns about the loyalty of citizens and other residents, with great suspi-
cion of those who did not support the United States's involvement in the
war.
39. One could reasonably argue that the prevalence of this phenomenon in just ninety years
demonstrates that the United States has been in a continuous state of perceived fear since the begin-
ning of World War 1. As each era can be defined in contrast to other eras and to periods of restraint,
however, I think these recurrences can be fairly labeled as cycles. Moreover, the cycles I refer to are,
with one exception, commonly recognized as relevant markers of civil liberties concerns. See, e.g.,
Tushnet, supra note 10, at 285 (calling references to these periods typical in discussions of civil
liberties and wartime).
40. Another possibility I do not consider here is the symbiotic effect of forced patriotism
laws. It may be that such laws foster periods of fear, as well as respond to them. I am grateful to Ann
Scales for suggesting this perspective to me. See generally DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS,
AND POWER (1988) (describing the role of political ritual and symbolism in constructing actual
political environments).
41. Two other historical periods in which one might examine civil liberties deprivations
resulting from nationalistic concerns are the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the Sedition
Act was, briefly, in place, see Law of July 14, 1798, ch. 73, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801), and the Civil
War, when President Lincoln attempted to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, see REHNQUIST, supra
note 10, at 24-25, and the federal government imposed loyalty oath requirements. HAROLD HYMAN,
THE ERA OF THE OATH 41-47 (1978). I do not discuss them here because they did not arise in the
context of serious threats external to the United States, a theme that connects most of the cycles I
discuss. Congress arguably enacted the Sedition Act for internal political purposes, though there was
ostensibly concern about threats from France. Lewis, supra note 10, at 264-65. The Civil War in-
volved an internal security threat, not one generated by another nation. It is true that during Recon-
struction, the federal government imposed loyalty oath requirements on southern citizens, particu-
larly Confederate prisoners. HYMAN, supra. While loyalty oaths always may suggest concerns about
forced patriotism, given the level of domestic strife following the conclusion of the war, these oaths
can be viewed more as an instrumental tool for enhancing stability than as a purely symbolic gesture
of nationalism. In any event, it can be argued that the same sense of nationalism and devotion to
icons strongly associated with forced patriotism laws was not prevalent during either of these peri-
ods.
42. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 969-83 (2001).
43. See GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION, supra note 15, at 105-08.
44. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 285.
45. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 220-26.
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Throughout this period, private organizations and individuals con-
tinued their efforts to encourage a sense of nationalism. 46 Groups such as
the Boy Scouts jumped on the patriotism bandwagon.47 Individuals car-
ried out acts of vigilantism, many of them violent, against persons per-
ceived to be disloyal.48 At the same time, patriotic songs, including the
absurdly mindless My Country Right or Wrong, increased in popularity.
49
In 1919, following the war's conclusion, the American Legion began a





In addition to these private movements, the state began to actively
involve itself in influencing patriotic ideals during this era. For instance,
the federal government tried to influence public feelings of loyalty
through propaganda campaigns led by the Committee on Public Informa-
tion.5' As Professor O'Leary observes: "The government became an ac-
tive participant and catalyst in mobilizing the patriotic movement and in
promoting a particularly intolerant and authoritarian brand of patriot-
iM,152ism.
' 2
More direct measures to chill disloyal speech became prevalent.
Much has been written about the wave of prosecutions under the federal
Espionage Act of 1917 and the subsequent ascendance of First Amend-
ment doctrine. While many of these cases involved charges that indi-
viduals actually interfered with the United States war effort or under-
mined the military draft, thus putatively addressing tangible security in-
terests, federal law also contained more overt forced patriotism meas-
ures. The Sedition Act, for example, forbade any person to utter, print,
write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language
intended to cause contempt or scorn for the form of government of the
United States, the Constitution, or the flag. 53 In some anti-sedition cases
during this period, the courts described the danger of the prohibited mes-
sages in terms of their non-patriotic qualities.54
Forced patriotism measures at the state and local level also began to
show up during this period. Although numerous states already had flag
46. Other commentators have also associated this period with the rise of militarism and mas-
culinism in American culture. See O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 227-32. See generally Ann Scales,
Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 25 (1989).
47. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 222-36.
48. Id. at 235.
49. Id. at 227.
50. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 16.
51. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 229.
52. Id. at 221.
53. Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553.
54. See, e.g., Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1917) (describing politi-
cal cartoon as punishable because "[ilts voice is not the voice of patriotism, and its language sug-
gests disloyalty").
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desecration laws in place by the beginning of World War I,55 many states
increased the criminal penalties for desecration.56 Texas broadened the
language of its flag desecration law to punish those who publicly, or
even privately, used language that cast contempt on the flag. 7 In 1918, a
Montana man was convicted and sentenced to twenty years of hard labor
when he refused to kiss an American flag and verbalized his opposition
to doing so.
58
Public laws governing flag salutes in schools during this period
were also stricter. Organizations ranging from the American Legion to
the Ku Klux Klan pushed these laws in conjunction with a broader patri-
otism movement. 59 The laws did not necessarily compel students to recite
the Pledge, but compulsion was understood as a condition of educational
culture.60 The laws did, however, impose legal duties on teachers or other
school officers to lead the Pledge of Allegiance or be subject to dismissal
or criminal punishment. 6' As one commentator noted:
The changed temper reflected in these later laws is striking. Unlike
the earlier statutes, which represented nothing more than benevolent
meddling with the curriculum, they evidence strong legislative fears
that without the stringent application of rewards and punishments,
many teachers would not seek to inculcate loyalty and patriotism in
their charges at all.6
2
Governmental command for respect and loyalty during this era is
emblematic of the fundamental dangers of forced patriotism. The Sedi-
tion Act, for example, implicated free speech concerns by demanding
loyalty through silence. Similarly, flag desecration laws forbade public
and, in some cases, private acts of disrespect toward a national icon. The
government's objective underlying these measures, as in forced speech
laws, was formal unity; the absence of dissent falsely implied a unified
polity.
B. The Second Cycle: World War II and Pearl Harbor
Most Americans are probably more familiar with the civil liberties
issues emerging from the period surrounding the Second World War than
55. ROBERT GOLDSTEIN, BURNING THE FLAG: THE GREAT 1989-90 AMERICAN FLAG
DESECRATION CONTROVERSY 5 (1996) [hereinafter, GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY].
56. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 234. There was some ambivalence about the application of
flag desecration laws to commercial and political campaign use, though the main application of laws
during this era was toward dissidents and immigrants. Id. But see Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34
(1907) (upholding law restricting commercial use of flag as applied to company selling "Stars and
Stripes" beer depicting images of American flags).
57. O'LEARY, supra note 29, at 234-35.
58. Id. at 236.
59. IRONS, supra note 15, at 16.
60. MANWARING, supra note 34, at 3-4.
61. Id. at4.
62. Id. at 3-4.
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in any other era. The focal point, of course, is the internment of Japanese
American citizens upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United
States.63 Although the military's exclusion order at issue in that case was
clearly not a forced patriotism measure because it was more instrumental
than symbolic, loyalty was a central rhetorical focal point of the Court's
analysis.64 In disputing military officials' claims of legitimate national
security concerns, Justice Murphy's dissent cited the congressional tes-
timony of General DeWitt justifying the order.65 The tenor of DeWitt's
remarks illustrates a focus on the patriotism of American citizens and
surely contributed to an atmosphere of fear.
There is no way to determine their loyalty .... The danger of the
Japanese was, and is now - if they are permitted to come back - es-
pionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he is an
American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does
not necessarily determine loyalty .... But we must worry about the
Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.66
Moreover, Justice Murphy's dissent pointed out that government of-
ficials relied upon evidence that some Japanese Americans residing in
the United States continued to practice Japanese cultural customs relating
to iconic representations and ceremonies, though there was no nexus
between such activities and the loyalty of those engaged in them.67
The connection between patriotism and the participation or non-
participation in ritualistic exercises of loyalty, however, preceded the
Japanese internment. Even before the formal involvement of the United
States in the war, concerns about patriotism were embedded in the na-
tional consciousness. The Supreme Court decided the first flag salute
case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis,68 in 1940, just as the poten-
tial of United States involvement in the war was growing stronger. In
that case, children adhering to the Jehovah's Witness faith objected to
their expulsion for failure to obey a school board regulation requiring all
schoolchildren to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.69
Because their religious faith forbade them to engage in worship of
graven images, they claimed that the regulation interfered with both their
63. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
64. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19 (noting that the exclusion order "was deemed necessary
because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group, most of
whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country"); and id. at 223-24 ("There was evidence of
disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great,
and time was short.").
65. Id. at 236 n.2 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (quoting testimony of LA. General DeWitt before the House Naval Affairs Subcommit-
tee to Investigate Congested Areas (emphasis added)).
67. Id. at 237, 237 n.5 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that participation in "emperor wor-
shipping ceremonies" was not correlated with disloyalty).
68. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
69. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591.
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right of free speech and their right of free exercise of religion under the
First Amendment. 70 While recognizing that the government may not in-
terfere with expressions of belief or disbelief, the Court upheld the
school's regulation, concluding that the state has a legitimate interest in
maintaining security through mandatory ceremonial acts. 71 Justice Frank-
furter's majority opinion strongly endorsed the state's claimed interests.
He wrote that "[a] society which is dedicated to the preservation of these
ultimate values of civilization may in self-protection utilize the educa-
tional process for inculcating those almost unconscious feelings which
bind men together in a comprehending loyalty, whatever may be their
lesser differences and difficulties.
'7 2
In one of the ugliest periods of our nation's history, Gobitis led to
widespread acts of private violence against Jehovah's Witnesses
throughout the United States. The Department of Justice reported hun-
dreds of attacks on Jehovah's Witnesses within two weeks of the Gobitis
decision.73 In one incident, a Witness hall of worship was burned.74 In
West Virginia, law enforcement officers forced a group of Witnesses to
drink castor oil and then tied them together and marched them through
the streets.75 Vigilantes in Nebraska abducted a Witness and beat and
castrated him.
76
Gobitis was decided in 1940, a year and a half before the Japanese
invasion of Pearl Harbor. Shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack, and the
United States's formal entry into World War II, measures directed at
patriotism and loyalty proliferated. In 1942, Congress enacted the federal
Pledge of Allegiance statute. While not mandating the Pledge, the federal
law codified the language of the Pledge and advised that it should be
recited while standing at attention with the right hand over the heart.77
70. Id. at 591-93.
71. Id. at 593,600.
72. Id. at 600. In contrast, Justice Stone's dissent observed that the uniformity sought by such
laws was not likely to be accomplished by state compulsion:
[WIhile such expressions of loyalty, when voluntarily given, may promote national unity,
it is quite another matter to say that their compulsory expression by children in violation
of their own and their parents' religious convictions can be regarded as playing so impor-
tant a part in our national unity as to leave school boards free to exact it despite the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of religion.
Id. at 605 (Stone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Stone also noted the free speech implica-
tions of such laws. Id.; see also Colin Bessonette, Q & A, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
June 30, 2002 at 2C ("Pledges of allegiance are marks of totalitarian states, not democracies, ... I
can't think of a single democracy except the United States that has a pledge of allegiance." (quoting
anthropologist David Kertzer)).
73. IRONS, supra note 15, at 22-23; MANWARING, supra note 34, at 163-66. At least one
scholar has disputed whether the wave of violence can be attributed entirely to Gobitis, though he
concedes that the persecution was probably broader and more intense as a result of the Court's
decision. MANWARING, supra note 34, at 163.
74. IRONS, supra note 15, at 23; MANWARING, supra note 34, at 164-65.
75. IRONS, supra note 15, at 23.
76. Id.
77. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2002).
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In West Virginia, about a month after the Pearl Harbor attack, the
state board of education adopted a regulation requiring all teachers and
pupils to participate in a salute honoring the nation as represented by the
flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.78 Failure to comply would be
treated as insubordination. 79 The connection between mandated loyalty
and national security was manifest in the Board's resolution, which ex-
pressed its sentiment that:
[N]ational unity is the basis of national security; that the flag of our
Nation is the symbol of our National Unity transcending all internal
differences, however large within the framework of the Constitution;
that the Flag is the symbol of the Nation's power; that emblem of
freedom in its truest, best sense; that it signifies government resting
on the consent of the governed, liberty regulated by law, protection
of the weak against the strong, security against the exercise of arbi-
trary power, and absolute safety for free institutions against foreign
aggression.
80
Notwithstanding the strong national feelings sympathetic to this
type of statement, the Supreme Court overruled Gobitis in West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette and invalidated the school board's regu-
lation.81 The Court's opinion expressed an unequivocal commitment to
invalidating forced speech patriotism measures as a fundamental viola-
tion of the freedom of conscience and speech.82
C. The Third Cycle: McCarthyism and the House Un-American Activities
Committee
Despite a short respite from major civil liberties concerns coincid-
ing with the end of World War 11,83 by 1947 a new cycle of forced patri-
otism emerged as the Cold War began and public officials began to fear
Communist infiltration into government agencies.84 The renewed sense
of urgency about loyalty and patriotism was symbolized by the activities
of the House Un-American Activities Committee ("HUAC"), which was
created in 1938, but converted to a standing committee in 1945.85 The
activities of HUAC in the late 1940s and the emergence of Senator Jo-
seph McCarthy as a leader of anti-subversive hysteria in 1950, coincid-
ing with the onset of the Korean War, led to numerous threats to civil
liberties.86
78. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625-27.
79. Id. at 626.
80. Id. at 626 n.2 (quoting Board resolution).
81. Id. at 642.
82. For other examples of state laws promoting forced patriotism, see GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL
REPRESSION, supra note 15, at 282-83 (describing sedition laws of Mississippi and Louisiana).
83. Id. at 287-88.
84. Id. at 289-98.
85. Id. at 240, 292.
86. See generally id. at 292-396.
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Many of these efforts were instrumental, rather than symbolic, such
as the widely reported efforts of congressional leaders in conducting in-
vestigative hearings to root out Communist subversion and the prosecu-
tion of Communist leaders under laws such as the Smith Act. But more
general concerns about patriotism also manifested themselves in a wide
range of federal and state laws requiring certain classes of persons to
recite loyalty oaths, usually as a condition of government employment.
87
Because of their breadth and generality, loyalty oaths for public employ-
ees, though not targeted at the general population, fit within the defini-
tion of forced patriotism.
First Amendment doctrine pertaining to loyalty oaths is a mixed
bag. While a number of Supreme Court decisions uphold some types of
loyalty oaths for public employees, the Court has limited the application
of such laws to persons who were actively affiliated with an organization
that advocated unlawful activity, who knew about those objectives, and
who specifically intended to further those unlawful goals.88 In other
words, the Court itself appears to recognize a constitutional distinction
between loyalty oaths that address specific threats to security and the
open-ended compulsion of fealty pledges. Toward the end of this cycle,
the Court also invalidated some loyalty oath provisions under the doc-
trines of vagueness and overbreadth.89
In addition to the specific focus on loyalty symbolized by congres-
sional investigations and loyalty oath statutes, Congress amended the
federal law defining the Pledge of Allegiance to add the words "under
God" during this cycle.90 Spurred by the efforts of the Knights of Co-
lumbus, a private fraternal organization, Congress adopted the revision at
least in part "to distinguish the American system of government from
87. Id. at 298-305, 348-60.
88. Compare, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952) (upholding
law prohibiting employment in public schools of persons who advocated the overthrow of the gov-
ernment by force or violence), overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-
06 (1967), with Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190 (1952) (invalidating law requiring public
employees to take oath swearing that they were not members of the Communist Party or any group
that advocated violent overthrow of the government). The scope of First Amendment law in this area
is also complicated by the subsequent adoption of a stringent test limiting the government's authority
to punish advocacy of unlawful conduct. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (limit-
ing punishment of subversive advocacy unless the "advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
89. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366-70 (1964) (invalidating loyalty oath provi-
sions for public university employees as unconstitutionally vague); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487-88 (1960) (invalidating state law requiring teachers to provide information about organizational
memberships as unconstitutionally overbroad). The relevance of loyalty oaths has not diminished for
some public employees, though it is no longer an issue that sits in the limelight. See Gabriel J. Chin
& Saira Rao, Pledging Allegiance to the Constitution: The First Amendment and Loyalty Oaths for
Faculty at Private Universities, 64 U. Prrr. L. REV. 431 (2003).
90. Pub. L. No. 396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954).
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communism and to underscore the commitment to inalienable, individual
rights guaranteed by God."
91
D. The Fourth Cycle: The Vietnam War
As Cold War fears of creeping Communism extended into southeast
Asia, the United States's military involvement in Vietnam became the
focal point of the next cycle of forced patriotism measures. The political
divisions within the nation over this issue generated substantial domestic
conflict, and fears about the lack of unity spawned efforts to silence dis-
loyal speakers. Not surprisingly, during this period government officials
actively prosecuted cases against protestors for mistreatment of the
United States flag.92 Indeed, one commentator has argued that "[t]he flag
... became the greatest single symbol of the cultural and political divide
that ripped the country apart during the Vietnam War.,
9 3
The Court addressed the constitutionality of flag desecration prose-
cutions in three important cases during this cycle. In the first case, Street
v. New York,9 4 the Court reviewed a man's conviction for flag desecra-
tion. After the murder of civil rights leader James Meredith, the defen-
dant went into public, burned a United States flag, and said "If they let
that happen to Meredith we don't need an American flag.",95 The Court
concluded that New York's desecration law was so broad that it allowed
Street to be convicted based only on his words, and that the law was
therefore unconstitutional as applied to his conduct.96 It did not, at that
time, hold that flag burning itself was constitutionally protected. In fact,
the Street decision came just a year after Congress passed a federal flag
desecration law.97
A few years later, the Court decided Spence v. Washington98 and
Smith v. Goguen.99 In Spence, the Court invalidated the conviction of a
man who was prosecuted for "improper use" of a flag when he displayed
an upside down U.S. flag on which he had formed a peace symbol with
black tape. °° In Smith, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting
91. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 471 (citing legislative history).
92. An influential law review article concerning punishment of conduct toward the flag also
appeared during this period. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). Also
during this cycle, the Court upheld the conviction of a man who publicly burned his draft registration
card in protest of the United States's involvement in the Vietnam War. See United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968). Although this case could be placed into the matrix of forced patriotism
cases, it focused more specifically on the elusive speech-conduct distinction. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
376-77.
93. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 12.
94. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
95. Street, 394 U.S. at 578.
96. Id. at 581.
97. GOLDSTEiN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 13.
98. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
99. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
100. Spence, 418 U.S. at 415.
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contemptuous treatment of the American flag as unconstitutionally
vague.' ° 1 The state had attempted to enforce the law against a man who
wore a flag patch on the seat of his blue jeans.'
02
The Court decided this trilogy of forced patriotism cases on fairly
narrow grounds, but did broach the broader subject of the state's power
to control loyalty. In Street, for example, the Court relied on Barnette in
stating that the First Amendment encompasses "the freedom to express
publicly one's opinions about our flag, including those opinions which
are defiant or contemptuous. '0 3 In Spence, however, the Court refused to
directly address whether the state has a legitimate interest in preserving
the integrity of the United States flag. 1 4 While recognizing that the state
may not punish people for failing to show respect for the flag, the Court
hinted that it might give weight to the state's interests in future cases
when it acknowledged that if the flag "may be destroyed or permanently
disfigured, it could be argued that it will lose its capability of mirroring
the sentiments of all who view it.""°5 In his dissent, then-Associate Jus-
tice Rehnquist argued that the majority failed to give appropriate
recognition to the state's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and unity. 0 6 He distinguished the flag misuse law from flag
salute requirements, arguing that the former does not demand
allegiance. 10 7 He expressed similar sentiments in his dissent in Smith.1
0 8
E. The Fifth (?) Cycle: The 1988 Presidential Election and the Flag
Burning Cases
During the late 1980s, the United States was not at war, and no real
or perceived external national security threats of any significant dimen-
sion existed.1' 9 Yet, in the heat of the 1988 presidential campaign, Vice
101. Smith, 415 U.S. at 567-68.
102. Id. at 568.
103. Street, 394 U.S. at 593.
104. Spence, 418 U.S. at 413-14.
105. Id. at 412-13.
106. Id. at 421 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 422 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. Smith, 415 U.S. at 601-04 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). At the state and local level during
this cycle, the prevalence of "red squads" investigating subversive political activities suggested a
widespread government distrust of American citizens. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note
55, at 504-09. These squads were notorious for engaging in surveillance of political activists and
maintaining investigative files on numerous citizens engaged in ordinary (and constitutionally pro-
tected) political activism. Id. As these efforts were at least nominally instrumental, however, I do not
include them in the category of forced patriotism.
109. No period of American history, of course, is without any conflict. During this period
violence in the Middle East continued, and United States troops engaged in fleeting involvement in
Grenada and Panama. Once and Future Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1990, at A18 (noting that
more than 230,000 U.S. troops were currently serving in the Persian Gulf; in 1989 27,000 troops had
invaded Panama,; and in 1983 8,000 troops went to Grenada). And though Cold War tensions per-
sisted through President Reagan's two terms in office, they largely dissipated with the fall of the
Berlin Wall. See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1496
(2003) (quoting JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, AND Now THIS, LESSONS FROM THE OLD ERA FOR THE NEW
ONE, IN THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at I (Strobe Tal-
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President George H.W. Bush and his political advisors successfully
manufactured a major patriotism issue to attack his Democratic oppo-
nent, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis.' 1" 0 Insofar as is discerni-
ble, this cycle is the only example of a period of patriotic hysteria that
was artificially produced entirely for partisan purposes.
Bush chose to highlight Dukakis's veto of a Massachusetts law that
would have required public schoolteachers to lead students in the daily
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance. 11 Little if any notice was given to
the fact that Dukakis had vetoed the law in response to an advisory opin-
ion from the highest court in Massachusetts 1 2 and the advice of the Mas-
sachusetts attorney general that the measure was patently unconstitu-
tional under Barnette. t3 Indeed, a Republican governor of Massachusetts
had vetoed essentially the same law just six years before Dukakis did."
14
Bush also made much of Dukakis's admission that he was a card-
carrying member of the ACLU and promoted his own candidacy with a
high profile visit to an American flag factory.' '5 Bush successfully made
doubts about Dukakis's loyalty a centerpiece of his campaign, which had
trailed in public opinion polls before he introduced the patriotism is-
sue."16
Perhaps not coincidentally, less than a month before the 1988 presi-
dential election, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Texas v. Johnson, a
flag burning protestor's constitutional challenge to his conviction under a
state flag desecration statute." 7 At the end of that term, well after Bush's
election, the Court invalidated the Texas law as a viewpoint discrimina-
tory regulation that violated the First Amendment." 8 In doing so, the
Court recognized that while the state has a legitimate interest in preserv-
ing the flag as a symbol of the nation, it cannot advance that interest in a
manner that favors respectful treatment and disfavors treatment that con-
veys opposition to the government's view." 19
bott & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001)); Peter J. Schraeder, Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining
U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa, POL. SCIENCE Q., Sept. 22, 2000, at 395.
110. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 73-76. That this cycle was artificially
created is supported by the fact that this is not one of the periods regularly incorporated into discus-
sions of wartime civil liberties. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 10; Cole, supra note 10; Tushnet,
supra note 10.
111. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 73-74.
112. Opinions of the Justices to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 878-79, 363 N.E.2d 251, 254
(Mass. 1977).
113. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 74.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 75; Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Nadine Strossen and Freedom of Expres-
sion: A Dialogue with the ACLU's Top Card-Carrying Member, 13 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J.
185, 185-86 (2003).
116. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 74.
117. 488 U.S. 907 (1988) (order granting writ of certiorari on Oct. 17, 1988).
118. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
119. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412-13, 418.
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The Court's sharply divided opinion in Johnson was met with ex-
traordinary hostility.120 Opponents called for a constitutional amendment
to establish a flag burning exception to the First Amendment, a move-
ment that was somewhat mollified by Congress's enactment of the fed-
eral Flag Protection Act. 12 In that law, Congress attempted to avoid the
constitutional infirmities of the Texas flag law by prohibiting public de-
struction of the flag for any reason, rather than only in circumstances that
would likely offend others.12 2 In its next term, however, the Court also
invalidated the new federal flag law. 123 In United States v. Eichman, the
Court inferred that the government's only purpose for prohibiting the
public desecration of a privately-owned flag could be to preserve the flag
as a national symbol, an overtly content-based justification. 24 Thus, in
both Johnson and Eichman, the Court repudiated the idea that the gov-
ernment could compel respectful treatment of the flag by punishing acts
that destroyed the flag. 25 In this manner, the cases represented the
strongest rebuke of forced patriotism since Barnette.
Another incident that fueled the patriotism controversy during this
period was a well-publicized dispute over a display created by art student
"Dread" Scott Tyler. 2 6 While Johnson was pending in the Court, Tyler
created an installation for a juried art exhibition of minority students'
work at the School of the Art Institute in Chicago. 127 The installation
displayed the exhibit's title, What Is the Proper Way to Display the
American Flag?, posted on the wall along with provocative photographs,
including a picture of South Korean demonstrators burning an American
flag and images of flag-draped coffins. 28 Beneath the wall display was a
platform holding a book in which viewers could write their own feelings
about the flag, while spread out on the floor underneath the platform was
an actual American flag. 129 Some people claimed that viewers had to step
on the flag in order to write their thoughts in the book, though it was
possible to reach the book from the side without stepping on the flag.
130
Tyler's display inflamed public opinion and generated widespread
condemnation and national media attention. Individuals tried to physi-
cally remove the flag from the exhibit. 131 The art school and its officials
were the subject of bomb scares and death threats. 32 A group of veterans
120. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 113-56.
121. Id. at 189-230.
122. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990).
123. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318.
124. Id. at 315-16.
125. Id. at 318; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 415-16.
126. See GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 77-88.
127. Id. at 77.
128. Id.
129. Id.





filed an unsuccessful lawsuit attempting to ban the exhibit. 133 Many pro-
tests targeting the exhibit were held, culminating with two demonstra-
tions involving thousands of people, mostly veterans, marching on the
school and the Art Institute of Chicago.134 Lawmakers at the federal,
state, and local level responded by adopting or amending flag desecration
laws to specifically forbid the display of flags on the ground. 135 The Illi-
nois legislature terminated public funding for the art school.
136
The synergy of these multiple episodes regarding patriotism and
loyalty shaped an intense public discourse for several years. Johnson and
Eichman spawned early efforts to amend the Constitution to exempt flag
burning from First Amendment protection, efforts that continue, albeit
with less fervor, to this day. 137 Despite the intensity of this cycle, serious
and widespread efforts to mandate patriotism did not again arise until
after the tragic events of September 11, 2001.
III. FORCED PATRIOTISM AND SEPTEMBER 1 1TH
In the time since the September 1 th terrorist attacks, fifteen states
and many local governments have either adopted laws in some way re-
quiring the regular recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance by schoolchil-
dren or modified their existing laws regarding the Pledge. 38 Most, if not
all, of this resurgence in legislative interest in forced Pledge require-
ments can be attributed directly to public officials' desire to respond in
some way to new threats to national security and the aspiration for na-
tional unity. 139 The New York City Board of Education, for example,
133. Id.
134. Id. at 81-82.
135. Id. at 85-86. The Chicago ordinance was quickly enjoined by a state court in a suit by a
group of artists including Tyler. Aubin v. City of Chicago, No. 89 CH 8763 (Cook Co. Cir. Ct.).
136. See GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 78.
137. See generally id.; e.g., Flag Protection Act of 2004, S. 516, 108th Cong.; Flag Protection
Act of 2003, H.R. 2162, 108th Cong.; H. Con. Res. 51, 108th Cong. (2003) (expressing the sense of
Congress that Congress should have the power to prohibit desecration of the flag); H.J. Res. 4, 108th
Cong. (2003) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution authorizing Congress and the States to
prohibit the act of desecration of the flag); S.J. Res. 4, 108th Cong. (2003) (same). At least one state
has followed suit. See H.B. 2694, 46th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Az. 2004) (outlawing flag burning with
intent to intimidate any person or group of persons).
138. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(2); 24 PENN. STAT. § 7-771; FLA. STAT. ANN. §
1003.44 (2004); Mo. REV. STAT. § 171.021 (Vernons 2004); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.082
(Vernons 2004). But see OHIO REV. CODE § 3316.602 (adding provision indicating that policies
adopted under Pledge provision shall not require students to participate in recitation of the Pledge,
and protecting such students from intimidation aimed at coercing participation).
139. It is possible, of course, that some of this resurgence was a reaction to the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004)
(dismissing case for lack of standing). In that case, the court of appeals held that all recitations of the
Pledge in public schools violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause because of its inclu-
sion of the words, "under God." Newdow, 292 F.3d at 612. The Newdow case itself was filed before
September I1, 2001, but the Ninth Circuit's decision declaring the California law to be unconstitu-
tional was issued on June 26, 2002. To the extent state Pledge laws were enacted after September
11th but prior to the Ninth Circuit's Newdow decision, they can fairly be said to have responded to
the attacks. After the Newdow decision, it is difficult to determine which factor, or if both factors,
contributed to the proliferation of Pledge laws.
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specifically referred to the September 1 th attacks in its resolution estab-
lishing a forced Pledge requirement. 140 Perhaps it is still too close to this
period to examine it in context, but preliminary signs indicate that a sixth
forced patriotism cycle is emerging.
The most extreme of these laws was enacted by the State of Colo-
rado. 14' Colorado imposed a mandatory requirement for both students
and teachers in public schools to "recite aloud" the Pledge on a daily
basis.142 Under the law, a student could be excused from reciting the
Pledge, but only if his or her parents first submitted a written note to the
school's principal asserting the objection and, implicitly, explaining the
grounds for that objection. 43 The law exempted teachers who had reli-
gious objections or who were non-citizens, but compelled teachers with
other objections of personal conscience to recite the Pledge.' 44 Thus,
neither teachers nor students (by themselves) could refrain from reciting
the Pledge by asserting their own political or other non-religious scruples
or beliefs.
Shortly after the Colorado law became effective, several students
and teachers filed a lawsuit challenging its constitutionality. A federal
district court judge issued a temporary restraining order forbidding the
state and the defendant school districts from enforcing the law. 145 In its
ruling, the district court found that Barnette created a bright-line First
Amendment rule against government compulsion of the Pledge for stu-
dents, teachers, administrators, and, indeed, any citizens."46 The court
also determined that the law was overtly viewpoint discriminatory in two
distinct ways. First, it discriminated between those who chose to recite
the Pledge and those who did not wish to recite it.147 Second, it discrimi-
nated between students and teachers by permitting different legal
140. State Bd. of Educ. Res. (N.Y. Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://www.nycenet.
edu/secretary/calendar/10-17-01/calendar.htm#20; see also Edward Wyatt, Board Votes to Require
Recitation of Pledge at Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at Dl.
141. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(2).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Barnette can be read to establish a First Amendment right for teachers as well as
students to refrain from reciting the Pledge, though it does not address the issue explicitly. Several
lower court opinions have, however, applied Barnette's protections to schoolteachers. See, e.g.,
Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 630-33 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanover v. Northrop, 325 F.
Supp. 170, 172-73 (D. Conn. 1970); Opinions of the Justices to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874,
878-79, 363 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Mass. 1977); State v. Lundquist, 262 Md. 534, 553-55, 273 A.2d 263,
273-74 (Md. 1971); accord Cary v. Bd. of Educ. of Adams-Arapahoe Sch. Dist., 598 F.2d 535, 541
(10th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that Barnette distinguished between legitimate curriculum require-
ments and mandatory recitation of the Pledge). But see Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1274
(7th Cir. 1979) (holding that probationary public school teacher did not have constitutional right to
refuse to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance, the singing of patriotic songs, and the celebration of
national holidays). For a commentary on this issue, see Laurie Allen Gallancy, Comment, Teachers
and the Pledge of Allegiance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (1990).
145. Lane v. Owens, Civil Action No. 03-B-1544 (PAC) (D. Colo.).
146. Transcript of Ruling 4-5, Lane v. Owens, Civil Action No. 03-B-1544 (PAC), D. Colo.
(copy on file with author) [hereinafter, Transcript].
147. Id. at 9.
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grounds for refusing to recite the Pledge. 148 In rejecting an argument by
some defendant school boards that they had adopted policies to alleviate
the burden on non-consenting students, the court observed that Colo-
rado's law placed a direct legal burden on the students and teachers, in-
dependent of whatever policies local schools had in place. 149 Finally, the
court rejected all government claims that the Pledge requirement served
any legitimate curricular goals. "Pure rote recitation of a pledge such as
this every day of the school year for one's tenure and matriculation
through the school system," the court stated, "cannot be said to be rea-
sonable or legitimate in a pedagogical sense."'
150
In Pennsylvania, the state legislature adopted a Pledge law requiring
officials at both public and private schools to provide for either the reci-
tation of the Pledge of Allegiance or the singing of the National Anthem
at the outset of each school day. 15' The statute allowed students to de-
cline to recite the Pledge or salute the flag if they had religious or other
personal objections to doing so, but required school officials to report
such refusal in writing to an objecting student's parents.152 In a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania law, a federal dis-
trict court held that the law's exemptions made it non-compulsory, and
therefore in compliance with Barnette.153 Nonetheless, the court held that
the provision requiring schools to notify parents of their children's objec-
tions to reciting the Pledge constituted discriminatory treatment of chil-
dren based on their viewpoints, and was therefore unconstitutional. 54
Though this provision did not impose direct penalties on students who
objected, the court concluded that the "parental notification provision...
offers a disincentive for students to opt out of reciting the Pledge or the
Anthem and thus it coerces students into reciting a state-sponsored mes-
sage.
155
Although not all of the post-September llth Pledge laws were as
extreme as Colorado's or Pennsylvania's, the proliferation of these regu-
lations has generated a renewed atmosphere of forced patriotism. Some
lawmakers may have drafted the laws in an attempt to avoid constitu-
tional problems, but it is not altogether clear their efforts are sufficient.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 10-11.
150. Id. at 11. In response to the lawsuit and restraining order, Colorado has repealed the part
of the law imposing an obligation to recite the Pledge on students and teachers, and instead requires
schools to provide an opportunity for "willing students" to recite it. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-
106(3).
151. 24 PENN. STAT. § 7-771.
152. Id.
153. The Circle School v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aftd, 381 F.3d 172
(3d Cir. 2004).
154. Id. at 625-26.
155. Id. at 623-26 (comparing parental notification requirements in Pledge context with paren-
tal notification in abortion regulations).
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Many of the statutes, for example, contain no direct enforcement
provisions.156 Pledge laws, however, need not have an explicit enforce-
ment mechanism in order to produce mandatory compliance. When Con-
gress first enacted a law endorsing the Pledge, it deliberately neglected to
implement an enforcement scheme. 157 This unusual regulatory paradigm
serves several purposes that protect public officials, yet undermine civil
liberties. If laws that lack formal enforcement mechanisms create the
imprimatur of authoritative rules, other public officials may take action
to enforce them under distinct legal provisions. For example, many state
laws authorize school districts to fire teachers and expel or suspend stu-
dents for insubordination or neglect of duty.15 8 Even in the absence of
formal enforcement mechanisms within the Pledge statutes, other state
officials may use disciplinary laws to threaten individuals who refuse to
recite the Pledge.
Second, as with Pennsylvania's law, some states' laws include pro-
visions allowing students, and sometimes teachers, to decline to recite
the Pledge. Although the Pennsylvania decision held that exemptions
were sufficient to alleviate the compulsory nature of the laws,1 59 it is not
altogether clear that it was correct. As drafted, these statutes are inter-
nally contradictory. On the one hand, they create a legal duty for students
to recite the Pledge. On the other hand, they attempt to comply with
Barnette by providing some sort of exemption provision. The contradic-
tion is even more severe in some jurisdictions because other states' laws
are more direct than Pennsylvania's in imposing a legal duty on students
and teachers to recite the Pledge.1 60 That is, there is a more direct contra-
diction in these laws between the obligation and the exemptions. The
confusion generated by conflicting directives in many of the Pledge laws
enacted since September 11 th increases the chance that local school dis-
tricts will unconstitutionally apply these statutes or that coercion will
arise from the group enterprise of daily recitation of the Pledge. In other
words, even with formal exemption provisions in place, the actual prac-
tices in schools may result in the violation of Barnette's principles.
156. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(2); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-3 (2004); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 37-13-6 (2004).
157. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 435 (noting that American Legion lobbyists stated that
the law was intended to be obeyed as an enactment of Congress without regard to the absence of
penalties).
158. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-106(1)(a) (providing that students may be suspended
or expelled for "continued willful disobedience or open and persistent defiance of proper author-
ity."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A- 11-904 (2004) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-301 (providing
that teachers may be dismissed for insubordination); Mo. REV. STAT. § 168.114 (same).
159. Circle School, 270 F. Supp 2d. at 621-22.
160. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 1003.44 (mandating that students shall recite Pledge every day
with the right hand over the heart, but requiring that students be informed of right not to participate).




What is more, the very practice of having a ritual recitation of the
Pledge every day may be coercive in the context of the public school
setting. Even precatory laws can create a culture of compliance that ef-
fectively establishes an enforceable regime. Indeed, it could be argued
that laws requiring teachers to lead students in the recitation of the
Pledge are unconstitutional even if they allow students to opt out. On this
view, the psychological coercion to participate in this public ritual, as in
the Establishment Clause context, may be the functional equivalent of
legal coercion.' 6 1 To the degree that the atmosphere created by group
recital of the Pledge is one in which dissenters feel ostracized by the so-
cial setting, any public school ceremony incorporating the Pledge vio-
lates Barnette's First Amendment principles.162 Indeed, Governor Jesse
Ventura vetoed a Minnesota Pledge statute that mirrored these states'
laws on the ground that, even with the exemption provision, it violated
Barnette. 1
63
Finally, the exemption provisions themselves may be unconstitu-
tional to the extent that they require parents, students, or teachers to dis-
close their reasons for seeking an exemption. 164 A government directive
requiring one to state a religious, political, or other philosophical objec-
tion to the recitation of the Pledge could itself be an impermissible forced
speech law.
In any event, the recent spate of Pledge laws reflects a renewed
sense of urgency about nationalistic unity and loyalty to the United
States, particularly in schoolchildren. At the same time, it demonstrates
that as a society, we seem to evolve very little in our collective under-
161. Greene, supra note 22, at 451-55. Abner Greene has argued that under current law, psy-
chological coercion of students to participate in publicly-led group utterances, religious or not, might
violate the Constitution. Id. Ultimately, however, Greene concludes that this result need not lead to
the invalidation of Pledge laws. He contends that by adopting a structural view of Establishment
Clause doctrine, from which the psychological coercion argument derives, and by reconceptualizing
our current understanding of the basis of the right not to speak, constitutional doctrine may be read
to forbid state-created psychological coercion of students to participate in religious exercises, but
permit teacher-led Pledge recitations, so long as students have the option to not participate. Id. at
489.
162. Id. at 470-71. But see Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township,
980 F.2d 437, 444-45 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that schools may carry on with patriotic exercises so
long as they are not compulsory, but that teachers leading students in recitation of the Pledge was not
inherently compulsory); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 638-39 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (noting possible inconsistency between Court's analysis of Establishment Clause coercion
principle regarding prayer at public school graduation ceremony and its failure to recognize that the
same students participated in a government-led recital of the Pledge of Allegiance).
163. Minnesota Governor Vetoes Pledge of Allegiance Requirement, Associated Press, May
23, 2002 available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org//news.aspxid=3861&SearchString=
venturaveto (last visited September 14, 2004).
164. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-16-108(b)(2)(A) (2004) (exempting students from recita-
tion of the Pledge if the student or student's parent objects to the recitation on religious, philosophi-
cal, or other grounds); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(b) (requiring a parent to file a written note
with the school principal stating an objection to the student's recitation of the Pledge in order to
excuse student). It is also unclear whether allowing parents, as opposed to students, to object satis-
fies the non-compulsion requirement of Barnette.
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standing of the civil liberties implications of laws that compel patriotism
and, accordingly, strip us of individual autonomy.
IV. WHY SOCIAL LEARNING ABOUT FORCED PATRIOTISM DOES NOT
OCCUR
Why does this pattern recur? Why do public officials repeatedly
turn to forced patriotism laws during times of perceived national crisis in
spite of obvious doubts about their constitutionality? Further, to the ex-
tent this pattern does recur, it seems worth examining whether it mirrors
what happens in other areas of civil liberties violations that arise in re-
sponse to national security crises.
A simple, but speculative, answer is that there is almost limitless,
unadulterated political benefit to elected officials who advance these
measures. At least one post-September 1 lth poll indicates that the major-
ity of Americans believe that schoolchildren ought to recite the Pledge
on a daily basis, suggesting implicitly that they disagree with the holding
in Barnette.1 65 Public support for and enactment of patently unconstitu-
tional forced patriotism measures is certainly not unheard of. Following
the Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson, for example, lawmakers con-
tinued to pass flag desecration laws in open defiance of the Court's deci-
sion.1 66 Two-thirds of Americans disagreed with the decision in Johnson
and supported a constitutional amendment exempting flag burning from
First Amendment protection. 67 Thus, political expediency surely offers
one explanation for the recurring pattern of forced patriotism laws.
A related, but distinct, point is that political actors are likely to turn
to forced patriotism measures in the face of great uncertainty. During
times of national crisis, and certainly after the United States has been
attacked, there is likely to be a collective feeling of helplessness. Strong
incentives exist for our government leaders to avoid the perception that
they are doing nothing to address threats or perceived threats. Forced
patriotism laws are a quick and simple, yet intangible, "fix" to more con-
crete problems of national security. They also provide officials with a
safe harbor by generating distraction from actual security problems that
165. See, e.g., G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Patriotism and Its Place in Wisconsin Hearts and Schools,
University of Wisconsin Survey Center, available at http://www.wisc.edu/uwsc/badgrel4.pdf (re-
porting poll by University of Wisconsin Survey Center showing that 70 percent of Wisconsin resi-
dents believe the Pledge should be required in all U.S. schools) (last visited September 14, 2004).
Furthermore, since the Newdow controversy, national polls show that 90 percent of Americans wish
to retain the Pledge's "under God" language. Gina Holland, Poll: Preserve Pledge Phrase, THE
CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 24, 2004, at A2. Of course, this is consistent with polls showing that most
Americans do not support many of the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Margaret
Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1035-36 & n.184 (1978) (citing studies).
166. GOLDSTEIN, FLAG CONTROVERSY, supra note 55, at 127-28.
167. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 606 n.142
(1993) (citing poll data).
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may require more instrumental, but also more complex and nuanced,
solutions.
But neither of these explanations is unique to forced patriotism
laws. If they explain the pattern of forced patriotism measures, they also
ought to explain repetition of other civil liberties violations during na-
tional security crises. That is, political expediency and the desire to ap-
pear actively engaged in addressing security should be as likely to com-
pel officials to repeat mass citizen internments as it would to spur them
to adopt mandatory Pledge laws.
Despite these common incentives, it can be argued that the govern-
ment does not repeat its mistakes as severely when it comes to more in-
strumental policy measures addressing national security concerns. Re-
cently, scholars examining civil liberties in the wake of September 11 th
have suggested that in other areas of government policymaking, such as
measures purporting to directly protect national security interests, there
appears to be some form of "social learning" that occurs over time. 61
Social learning suggests that courts and other institutions tend to learn
from past crisis periods that government claims of national security have,
in retrospect, often been exaggerated, thus making people more skeptical
about such claims in the present context. 169 Social learning may also oc-
cur because the revelation of this information also generates attention
from media and public interest organizations vigilant about guarding
against replicating past violations. 1
70
Applying the social learning thesis, Mark Tushnet has "defended"
the Korematsu case as an incidence of social learning that perhaps has
prevented a direct recurrence of similar detentions during crises since
World War H. 171 As Tushnet explains:
The social learning is this: Knowing that government officials in the
past have in fact exaggerated threats to national security or have
taken actions that were ineffective with respect to the threats that ac-
tually were present, we have become increasingly skeptical about
contemporary claims regarding those threats, with the effect that the
scope of proposed government responses to threats has decreased. 172
Tushnet elaborates on his thesis by tracing the historical patterns
similar to those examined in this essay, but describing how social learn-
ing may account for why subsequent generations have generally not re-
168. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 10, at 287-90.
169. Id. Other scholars, such as David Cole, are more skeptical about such claims. They argue
that in fact such social learning may simply result in government decisionmakers learning to better
mask the repetition of past civil liberties offenses. Cole, supra note 10, at 3-4.
170. Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt by
Association Critique, 101 MiCH. L. REv. 1408, 1417 (2003).
171. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 307.
172. Id. at 283-84.
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peated the civil liberties mistakes of the past in the context of instrumen-
tal policy measures. 173 At the very least, Tushnet argues, we learn from
our mistakes to the extent that we do not repeat precisely the same er-
rors.174 Using Korematsu as an illustration, he describes how the retro-
spective view of the government's arguments about national security as
having been greatly exaggerated has led us to be more skeptical about
taking similar action in response to subsequent national threats.1
75
Tushnet supports his claim by describing how the current crisis has not
yielded policy measures as sweeping as those during the Japanese in-
ternment, and that many of the current potential civil liberties concerns
are focused on non-citizens, as opposed to American citizens of foreign
ancestry.
176
Another example he could have drawn upon was the unsuccessful
effort of Senator S. I. Hayakawa to amend federal law to permit the de-
tention of Iranian nationals in the United States during the Iranian hos-
tage crisis. 177 That episode may illustrate Tushnet's social learning thesis
in two ways. First, the measure did not pass despite extreme national
antipathy toward Iran. Second, had it passed, it would not have affected
American citizens of Iranian descent.
If social learning does occur, to some degree, with respect to con-
crete policy measures designed to protect national security, the same
learning experience does not appear to occur, or at the very least occurs
at a slower pace, in the context of symbolic forced patriotism measures.
As the repeated examples from the historical cycles of fear described
above illustrate, government actors repeatedly turn to forced patriotism
measures in times of national security crises, seemingly without regard
for constitutional limitations. It seems worth exploring why social learn-
ing does not occur here.
Before doing so, however, I react to one possible critique of the the-
sis that social learning does not occur in the context of forced patriotism.
One might reasonably challenge my assertion by pointing to the preva-
lence of exemption provisions in many of the current wave of Pledge
laws. These exemptions might provide some evidence that learning has
indeed occurred, and that legislators are cognizant of Barnette. One re-
sponse to this is that if these exemption provisions manifest any learning,
it is not the type of social learning that occurs from internalizing the wis-
dom and experience of past mistakes. If the experience in Colorado is at
all representative, lawmakers have little use for Barnette or for federal
courts that apply it. After a federal court barred enforcement of Colo-
173. Id. at 284-90.
174. Id. at 292.
175. Id. at 284-90.
176. Id. at 296-97; see also Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of
History, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 571 (2002).
177. See 127 CONG. REC. 178-79 (1981); 126 CONG. REc. 5815-18 (1980).
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rado's mandatory Pledge law, the Governor and the majority leader of
the State Senate publicly attacked the ruling, saying that there was no
constitutional basis for it and boasting that the law would be upheld after
a trial on the merits.178 Such statements demonstrate no social learning,
but rather illustrate that there is actually very little understanding among
public officials about the problems with mandatory oaths. Indeed, based
on their public statements, it is clear that lawmakers' goals in enacting
mandatory Pledge laws today are often no different from in the era pre-
ceding Barnette. Another stark illustration of the lack of learning was
demonstrated when students at one Denver public middle school were
forced to recite the Pledge even after the temporary restraining order in
the Colorado Pledge case. 79 Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the pres-
ence of formal exemptions in the face of legal commands to recite the
Pledge does not necessarily eliminate problems of coercion and unconsti-
tutional application. Finally, many of the laws enacted since September
1 th do not exempt teachers from compelled recitation. 80 Thus, without
regard to the existence of some exemptions, forced patriotism is alive
and well in the twenty-first century.
If I am right that social learning has not occurred in the forced pa-
triotism context, there are a few reasons that might explain that phe-
nomenon. It may be that two preconditions necessary for social learning
in other civil liberties contexts are not present in the forced patriotism
area. First, scholars have argued that social learning occurs when offi-
cials overreact to threats of national security and develop policy re-
sponses that are not in fact well designed to enhance security.' 8' In hind-
sight, such overreactions tend to be revealed, thus leading to greater
skepticism in future generations. 1
82
In the case of forced patriotism laws, no such precondition exists.
Lawmakers who sponsor forced patriotism initiatives can be viewed as
overreacting, but not because they have misrepresented any threats. No
one pretends, except in the most abstract sense, that flag salutes and
Pledge of Allegiance recitals directly enhance our national security.
Thus, there is no hindsight, no second guessing, of patriotism measures
because there has been no initial representation of their effectiveness.
178. Monte Whaley, 4 School Districts Can't Force Pledge; Ban Temporary; Hearing Set
Friday, DENVER POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at BI (quoting Governor Bill Owens and State Senator John
Andrews). Indeed, in a television appearance on a local public affairs talk show, Senator Andrews
implied that Barnette was wrongly decided.
179. See The Open Forum, DENVER POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at E2 (describing the enjoined Colo-
rado law as "requiring" students to recite the Pledge and quoting letters from students reflecting that
they were being forced to recite the Pledge on a daily basis).
180. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-106(2) (not exempting teachers from compelled
recitation on the grounds of personal conscience); FLA. STAT. ANN. 1003.44 (exempting unwilling
students, but not teachers, from Pledge recital); MO. REV. STAT. § 171.021 (same).
181. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 287-90.
182. Id.
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Later generations may look back with skepticism, but not because we
think the state has lied to us.
Second, the stakes for lawmakers are simply not as high when
forced patriotism measures are challenged. The social learning hypothe-
sis depends to a significant degree on government institutions' respon-
siveness to retrospective factual analysis of historical national security
crises. 83 At least part of that responsiveness may be attributable to legal
sanctions and constraints that courts may externally impose in public
interest litigation.' 84 Legal challenges to tangible national security meas-
ures may result in high social costs, costs that may reflect adversely on
the politicians who initially proposed and supported such laws. For ex-
ample, unconstitutional regulations of conduct in the enforcement of
national security laws may lead to suppressed evidence, invalidated con-
victions, or civil claims for substantial damages, at least against the law's
enforcers. Such factors may be sufficient to deter government decision-
makers from repeating their past mistakes, or at least encouraging cau-
tion.
But constitutional remedies are also available in the context of
forced patriotism measures. Surely these must provide disincentives even
to lawmakers bent on reelection, as there are costs that may have to be
weighed in determining whether to advance measures of highly ques-
tionable constitutionality.
Unlike other types of policy measures, however, forced patriotism
laws may, in reality, be less susceptible to meaningful constitutional
remedies than would more instrumental policy measures. First, legisla-
tive bodies, such as state legislatures or school boards, establish most
forced patriotism measures. Despite the apparent unconstitutionality of
such measures, legislators have little to fear from a constitutional attack
on forced patriot acts. Under constitutional remedies law, legislators are
absolutely immune for any actions taken in their legislative capacity,
even if their acts are blatantly and intentionally unconstitutional. 85
Moreover, it may be difficult for plaintiffs who wish to challenge
such laws to find an appropriate defendant. Many Pledge laws, for ex-
ample, do not provide for specific enforcement by the state or for state
penalties for noncompliance. Accordingly, it may be difficult to identify
an appropriate state defendant to sue for injunctive relief.186 Lawmakers
thereby make it difficult for civil rights litigants to stop the law's en-
forcement on a statewide level to the extent that they permit the decen-
183. Id.
184. Chesney, supra note 170, at 1417.
185. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (holding that state legislators are
absolutely immune from constitutional tort damage actions).
186. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (allowing suits against state officials for
prospective injunctive relief barring enforcement of unconstitutional state laws).
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tralization of the law's enforcement. As a practical matter, it may be dif-
ficult, with the possible exception of a defendant class action, to sue all
the potential enforcers of such laws.
Local officials who do enforce forced patriotism laws may be sub-
ject to claims for damages. In the context of Pledge laws, school officials
may be liable for compensatory damages should they force a teacher or
student to engage in patriotic speech involuntarily.' 87 The effectiveness
of such a remedy may be limited, however, because it will often be diffi-
cult to prove actual damages in such a circumstance, 188 and nominal
damages may provide little deterrence. 189 In some cases, student or
teacher plaintiffs may be able to demonstrate entitlement to punitive
damages, but they would first have to demonstrate a high degree of men-
tal culpability in order to sustain such an award. 190 Moreover, it is
unlikely that a jury would award punitive damages where local officials
can claim that the state imposed upon them a legal duty to require the
Pledge. Thus, deterrence that might ordinarily be generated by the possi-
bility of damages actions in other civil rights contexts may not deter offi-
cials in forced patriotism cases.
Actions for injunctive and declaratory relief may yield substantial
deterrence if meaningful costs are associated with their effective en-
forcement. Unlike structural reform injunctions, however, it is unlikely
that it will be costly for public officials to comply with prohibitory in-
junctions. The state's officials may simply throw up their hands, cease
enforcement of the unconstitutional policy, and blame the whole thing on
the intervention of meddlesome, activist courts.
Moreover, savvy defendants may simply abandon their unconstitu-
tional policies in the face of lawsuits, thus creating a moving target for
187. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
188. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (holding that dam-
ages may be awarded for deprivations of rights only if the deprivation results in actual harm); Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-64 (1978) (holding that compensable injury must result directly from
denial of constitutional right). In addition, local officials might try to claim qualified immunity from
damages if they can successfully demonstrate that reasonable officials in their position would not
have known that their actions violated a clearly established constitutional right. Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). But see Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding that a reasonable school official would have known that disciplining student for
refusing to recite Pledge violated clearly established First Amendment rights).
189. What is more, attorneys' fees may not necessarily be awarded in cases where the sole
remedy is nominal damages. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (holding that in some cases
where only relief obtained in civil rights action is nominal damages, it may be appropriate to award
no statutory fee award at all). But see Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1230-32 (10th
Cir. 2001) (suggesting that fee awards might be appropriate in nominal damages cases where litiga-
tion achieves certain public goals).
190. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (holding that punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 may be awarded only where "defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or
intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of oth-
ers").
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litigants challenging forced patriotism laws.191 What is more, there is a
more tangible consequence if officials abandon or even repeal their
forced patriotism measures. Under the Supreme Court's decision in
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources, 92 repeal or substantial modification of
forced patriotism laws during the course of litigation may undermine
plaintiffs' claims for recovery of attorneys' fees, 193 the only substantial
financial consequence that might flow from the adoption of forced patri-
otism laws.' 94 Thus, to the degree that attorneys' fees act as a general
deterrent for future unconstitutional conduct in cases where other reme-
dies do not, public officials might undermine that deterrent effect by
avoiding fee liability if they abandon forced patriotism laws shortly after
litigation begins. Accordingly, this too may limit the possibility of legal
action serving as a meaningful deterrent to the future adoption of such
laws.
In combination, these remedies problems limit the possibilities of
effective constitutional enforcement in the context of forced patriotism
laws. The lack of remedies, in turn, minimizes the chance that true social
learning will occur.
CONCLUSION
Throughout our nation's experience the historical cycles of fear
have led to the widespread adoption of forced patriotism measures.
Given the apparent lack of social learning regarding forced patriotism
measures, what can American society reasonably do to discourage con-
tinual repetition of these cycles? It seems worth exploring what types of
conditions would be necessary to create social learning in the forced pa-
triotism context.
Perhaps our society needs mechanisms to facilitate greater transpar-
ency in the discourse about the need, or lack thereof, for forced patriot-
ism laws, or better understandings about the impact such laws have on
the independent thinking of free citizens. Or perhaps we need to pay
more attention to the history of forced patriotism laws and their profound
impact on dissenters in the past century.
How can we best accomplish this? The paradoxical conclusion that
I have come to, is that we do indeed need the Pledge of Allegiance in our
191. See Monte Whaley, Pledge Law Set Aside for 9 Months; Action Gives General Assembly a
Chance to Rewrite or Eliminate Legislation, DENVER POST, Aug. 24, 2003, at B1.
192. 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (holding that plaintiffs may not be prevailing parties under fee-
shifting statutes where the defendant voluntarily changes its behavior after the onset of litigation but
before there is a "judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties").
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2000).
194. But see Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding




schools. But when I say this, I do not mean to endorse the ritualistic,
value-inculcating, unthinking, rote recitation of the Pledge that is the
hallmark of forced patriotism laws.
Rather, it is clear to me that American children ought to be taught
about the Pledge in its historical context. We need education about the
Pledge, where it came from, what its meaning is. We need meaningful
and critical discourse about the multiple understandings and paradox of
patriotism. We need to teach children the history of Gobitis and Barnette,
and explain to them how shamefully our society has treated its dissident
members in times of national crisis. In short, we need to teach students to
think for themselves, and to do this we must enhance the real civic edu-
cation of our youth. 195 Then, and only then, will we achieve social learn-
ing about forced patriotism.
195. At least one other scholar has come to a similar conclusion. In a thoughtful article pub-
lished after this paper was presented, but before it was published, Professor Martin Guggenheim
argues we should demand that teachers incorporate the Pledge into a valuable civics lesson that
includes instruction about the right not to participate and the dangers of state compelled expression.




STOLEN FREEDOMS: ARABS, MUSLIMS, AND SOUTH
ASIANS IN THE WAKE OF POST 9/11 BACKLASH
DALIA HASHADt
Since 9/11, the United States government's "War on Terror" has, in
large part, been an attack on innocent Arabs, people from the Middle
East and South Asia, and Muslims. Using race, ethnicity and religion as a
proxy for criminal behavior, law enforcement has zeroed in on people of
certain ethnicities and a single faith. The Department of Justice (DOJ),
now engulfed in the Department of Homeland Security, has rolled out
programs and established policies that target, harass and in many in-
stances, make life miserable for Arabs and Muslims in this country. The
overwhelming majority in these groups are innocent of any criminal ac-
tivity, however their persecution by zealous law enforcement results in
thousands of needless tragedies. For every day that has passed since
9/11, there are dozens of painful stories borne of government-instituted
discrimination and racist implementation of policy.
I. SALMAN HAMDANI
One of my favorite stories is incredibly painful. It speaks volumes
about American law enforcement's willingness to blindly approach the
"War on Terror" by using the failed tools of ethnic and religious profil-
ing. On the morning of September l1th, 2001, Mohammed Salman
Hamdani, a 23 year-old Pakistani Muslim left his home in Bayside,
Queens, a borough of New York City.1 "Salman," as he was known, was
headed toward his new job as a lab technician in Rockefeller Center,
23right in the middle of Manhattan. He'd been there just a month.3 A
sports enthusiast, a Star Wars fan, an excellent student who aspired to be
a doctor, he was a beloved son, brother and friend.4 The last hours of his
life tell you something about his character. He had stayed up late on Sep-
tember 10th, working on an application for medical school and tending to
his father, who had a history of heart problems.5 Salman sat up with him
until 2:30 in the morning, checking his blood pressure and taking his
pulse.6 A remarkable young man, he had worked as a police cadet and a
f The Arab, Muslin, South Asian Advocate for the American Civil Liberties Union's Cam-
paign Against Racial Profiling. B.A in Environmental Policy, University of California at Berkeley;
J.D., New York University School of Law. This speech was originally presented at a symposium on
March 5, 2004.
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part time ambulance rider.7 He was a first responder, trained to be first on
the scene of an accident. Indeed, he took his training, experience and the
values of assisting people in need so seriously that the previous summer,
on a road trip with his father, he insisted on stopping to help people
pulled over on the side of the road.8 Generosity of spirit and service ex-
tended to all aspects of Salman's life. His brother likes to tell of how he
would drop a $20 bill near a homeless person so that they would not have
to suffer the indignity of asking. 9 By all accounts, Salman was a charita-
ble and kind-hearted person.
Judging by the time he had left the house, Salman should have been
somewhere on the number seven subway line, an elevated train that con-
nects Queens, a New York City borough, to Manhattan. 10 He should have
been far from the chaos of the downtown disaster and maybe even in a
position to view the smoke and devastation at the World Trade Center.1
Knowing her son's generous nature, his mother Talat Hamdani worried
that he might have gone down to the World Trade Center to help. 12 The
Hamdanis did not sleep that night, waiting for their son who never came
home. The next day, family gathered at the Hamdani household and cre-
ated a flyer like so many thousands of other New York families that day,
posting it throughout the city and searching for anyone who might have
seen him.13 A picture of Salman wearing a tie and a big smile stood right
above the word "MISSING."
The Hamdani family spread out to the local area hospitals, and plas-
tered the flier all over New York City, hoping that someone, somewhere,
could help them find Salman.14 Nothing resulted. 5 Then one day, mem-
bers of the press from the New York Post, New York Daily News, and
Newsday showed up at their front door, telling Salman's parents that the
government had created their own flier.' 6 They too were looking for
Salman who was "wanted for questioning" in connection with the 9/11
terrorist attacks.' 7 The flier was being distributed among police sta-
tions.18 There was a big picture of Salman, indicating that he was 23
years old, Pakistani, Muslim, and last seen on the morning of September
11 th; but this one didn't say "MISSING." Reporters contacted the Ham-
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Austin Fenner, Muslim Cop Cadet Mourned, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 6, 2002, at 10.
10. Shane, supra note 1, at 3G.
11. Id.
12. Newsweek Web Exclusive, First Person: One Year Later - For Victims' Families, Rescue
Workers and Survivors, Life Will Never Be the Same (Sept. 11, 2002), at http://msnbc.msn.com/
id/3068112 (last visited May 25, 2004) [hereinafter First Person].
13. Shane, supra note 1, at 3G.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. First Person, supra note 12.
17. Shane, supra note 1, at 3G.
18. First Person, supra note 12.
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dani family about the flyer.'9 The New York Post Headline on October
12, 2001, read "Missing - or Hiding?, 20 The New York Times reported
that the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) were looking for Salman. 21 And indeed they were.
The FBI started harassing the Hamdani family.22 They searched through
Salman's room and things, questioning family and friends, wanting to
know where he was. Asking these questions of parents who still slept in
the living room with the lights on, worried that they might not hear him
if Salman came home in the middle of the night.23 He never came home.
The harassment and the suspicion, however, continued to visit them
through continued government questioning. Then one day, police were
again knocking on the door. Salman's mother recalled:
It was 11:30 p.m. on the 20th of March, a Wednesday, when two po-
lice officers came. We still slept in the living room expecting Sal-
man. My husband opened the door and they walked in. They did not
tell my husband to take a seat. They told my husband "Your son has
been identified through DNA. Your son is dead." And my husband
sat down on the floor. I told my husband, "They're lying." But I be-
lieved it. Salman worked as a DNA lab analyst, and he had said,
"Mom, DNA is a one in a billion chance to match." The next morn-
ing we told the family and went down to the medical examiner's of-
fice. They found the lower part of his body.
My brother called NYPD, and he asked "How does the department
handle the death of a cadet?" They said they'd handle it. Commis-
sioner Kelly was the first to say he would come. I'm grateful that
[they] honored him as a son of New York. He got a wonderful salute.
He has become our role model now.24
Mayor Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly
showed up to honor Salman at his hero's funeral with 500 people in at-
tendance.25 His body was found at the World Trade Center site along
with his medical bag and Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) identi-
fication.26 It seems that, as his parents suspected, Salman used his police
cadet and EMT identification cards to hitch a ride with a police or fire
truck into lower Manhattan where he died trying to help other people
27who found themselves at the wrong place, at the wrong time.
19. Shane, supra note 1, at 3G.
20. William J. Gorta & Simon Crittle, Missing - or Hiding? - Mystery of NYPD Cadet from
Pakistan, N.Y. POST, Oct. 12, 2001, at 11.
21. Shane, supra note 1, at 3G.
22. See id.
23. First Person, supra note 12.
24. Id.
25. Fenner, supra note 9, at 10.
26. Id.
27. Shane, supra note 1, at 3G.
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There is something here that doesn't make sense. One day, Mo-
hammed Salman Hamdani is a suspected terrorist, the next he is recog-
nized as a hero. What made him a suspect in the first place? The answer
reveals an incredibly frightening truth about post 9/11 America. Salman
was a suspect because he was a Muslim, because he was Pakistani, and
because he did well as a biochemistry major.28 That's it. And in post 9/11
America, that is all it takes.
Salman Hamdani's story is emblematic of the turn taken by this
country after 9/11. Innocent people's reputations and lives maligned and
even destroyed simply because they are from certain immigrant groups.
Since 9/11, a series of policies and practices embody this administra-
tion's commitment to fighting the "War on Terror" by attacking Arabs,
Muslims and South Asians. The following are a few highlights and ex-
amples of the broader attack on civil liberties that will affect every one of
US.
II. GOVERNMENT SWEEPS AND DETENTION
After September 11 th, Attorney General John Ashcroft held a series
of press conferences, updating the public on the administration's actions
to apprehend the terrorists responsible for September 11 th and prevent
any future attack. At a press briefing, Ashcroft described the government
campaign:
The Department of Justice is waging a deliberate campaign of arrest
and detention to protect American lives. We're removing suspected
terrorists who violate the law from our streets to prevent further ter-
rorist attack. We believe we have al Qaeda membership in custody,
and we will use every constitutional tool to keep suspected terrorists
locked up.29
Indeed, the Department of Justice (DOJ) was waging a fierce cam-
paign of preventative "arrest and detention."3° Contrary to the impression
given by Ashcroft, the results were doing nothing to protect American
lives. Instead of pulling criminals from America's streets, law enforce-
ment questioned, harassed and arrested thousands of people who did
nothing more than come from a Muslim or Arab background. These were
not al-Qaeda members in custody, rather they were Arab and Muslim
immigrant men working at fast food restaurants, getting an education at
an American university, driving a cab - normal people. In government
conflation of religious and ethnic identity with criminal behavior, thou-
28. See id.
29. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Attorney General Provides Total Number of Federal
Criminal Charges and INS Detainees (Nov. 27, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/
2001/agcrisisremarksl 1_27.htm (last visited May 25, 2004) (providing the total number of federal




sands of people found themselves at imminent risk of being labeled sus-
pected terrorists and indefinitely losing their legal rights. FBI and Immi-
gration and Naturalization Services (INS) agents descended on Arab and
Muslim men in their homes, mosques and workplaces, often arresting
them simply on the basis of their ethnicity or religion and minor immi-
gration violations. While the term is loaded, an immigration violation can
happen quite easily, and the civil violation is generally not connected to
any criminal activity. These "immigration violations" could be as minor
as not notifying the INS of a move within ten days or working at Dunkin'
Donuts on a tourist visa. In many instances, immigration violations oc-
curred because of the notoriously slow backlog at the INS. Many Arab
and Muslim men married to U.S. citizens were still waiting for the INS
to process their forms when they were swept up, jailed and even deported
for "immigration violations." In some cases, there was no immigration
violation to speak of. Thousands of Arab and Muslim men disappeared
off the streets of their neighborhoods, never having committed a criminal
act.
Far from denying the use of visa violations as a predicate for arrest-
ing people absent criminal suspicion, Ashcroft proudly declared the U.S.
government strategy of using immigration law as a surrogate for criminal
behavior:
Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest mob-
sters for "spitting on the sidewalk" if it would help in the battle
against organized crime. It has been and will be the policy of this
Department of Justice to use the same aggressive arrest and detention
tactics in the war on terror.
Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa -
even by one day - we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you
will be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible.
31
[It is] estimated [that] thousands were arrested on minor immigra-
tion violations, like overstaying tourist visas. Ashcroft continually re-
minded the American public the U.S. government was successfully re-
moving suspected terrorists from our streets. Time and again, Ashcroft
held press briefings to update America on their progress. It started out
shortly after 9/11 when we were told that suspected terrorists were
picked up and in government custody. The number of "suspects" contin-
ued to increase until the first week of November 5, 2001 when the num-
ber announced by Ashcroft climbed to just under 1,200.32
31. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks at the U.S. Mayors Conference (Oct.
25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10_25.htm (last
visited May 25, 2004).
32. Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, Count of Released Detainees Is Hard to Pin Down, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 2001, at A10.
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The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was among the con-
cerned voices, demanding to know who was being held, where and why.
In what became a hallmark of this administration, Ashcroft grew more
secretive. Not only would the Attorney General refuse to respond to
those concerns, he declined to release further information on the numbers
of people being detained. We often hear 1,200 bantered around as the
number of Arabs and Muslims detained after 9/11. That number is a fic-
tion representing only the last number Ashcroft disclosed. Long after that
last disclosure, Muslim and Arab men continued to disappear off of
America's streets.
Due to information derived from family, friends and detainees them-
selves, immigration advocates estimate that the total number of Arabs
and Muslims detained in the post 9/11 sweeps falls at around several
thousand. It turns out that these men were not the terror suspects
Ashcroft described. Advocate groups rightly point out that those detained
in these sweeps were not publicly charged with a crime of terrorism;
however, they all have one thing in common - they are Arab and Muslim
men. Many with minor immigration violations, some whose status was
just fine.
Law enforcement stopped men with an Arab, Middle Eastern, South
Asian or Muslim appearance, detaining many. As the testimony of one
man shows, after September 1 th, that was, in and of itself, crime enough
to warrant arrest:
On September 11 th, 2001, I was driving my car and a cop pulled me
over. He asked me where I'm from. This is the first time a cop pulled
me over and asked me where I'm from before I talked. Usually they
ask after you talk. By the accent they are interested to know where
you are from. He was angry. He wants to know where I am from or
the reason to stop me is just to ask where I am from. So I said, "why
stop me?" He said, "I stop you for a red light. Give me your license."
I gave him the license. He went to his car. Two or three minutes later,
he comes back and says "where are you from?" I said, "I am from Is-
rael." He said, "Arabic or Jewish?" I said, "What's the difference?"
He said, "It's a big difference." I said, "I'm Arabic," and he said,
"you are under arrest." 33
Once detained, these men found themselves lost within a system
that no longer seemed to recognize basic due process rights. In June of
2003, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the DOJ's internal
watchdog issued a report about the post 9/11 detentions that amounted to
a sweeping indictment of the Bush Administration. 34 The report con-
33. PERSONS OF INTEREST. (The Documentary Campaign 2003).
34. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REviEw OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
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firmed what the ACLU had been publicly alleging: Immigrants with no
connection to the terror attacks spent months in detention under condi-
tions where they were denied basic rights. 35 The specific findings of the
report include:
* A "communications blackout" was imposed, preventing detainees
from calling anyone including attorneys, family and the press.
36
When the "blackout" ended, the Justice Department told prison offi-
cials "not to be in a hurry" to assist detainees in contacting attorneys
or consulates;
37
* The DOJ instituted an official "no bond" policy that prevented de-
tainees from access the justice system;
38
e The government process for clearing immigrants of any connection
to the terrorist attacks was understaffed and not given "sufficient pri-
ority;" clearance took an average of 80 days and in some cases more
than 200;
39
* The OIG found that immigrants "who had no connection to terror-
ism" were labeled suspects in an "indiscriminate and haphazard man-
ner."
,40
In a country that is supposed to be committed to liberty, these
abuses, reported by our own government, should shock every American.
They certainly astonished these immigrants. No one should be subject to
lengthy detentions without charge and certainly not subject to these de-
scribed conditions.
Announced by Attorney General, John Ashcroft, the FBI com-
menced a massive program of finding and questioning Arabs. Between
September 1 lth and November 9th, 2001, the INS compiled a list of im-
migrants whose characteristics were similar to those of the 9/11 hijack-
ers. Based on visa type, gender, age, sex and date of entry into the U.S,
initially 5,000 men found themselves targets of the questioning, then
3,000. Subsequently, Ashcroft initiated a program to question thousands
of Iraqi nationals and Iraqi-Americans. Absent any individualized suspi-
cion, the FBI showed up, almost always unannounced, at the homes and
workplaces of men and women who had no connection to wrongdoing
and no useful information to offer up. While touted as voluntary, the
questioning tactics where often so aggressive and the presence of unex-
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oiglspecialI0306/full.pdf (last visited May 24, 2004).
35. Id. at 195-97.
36. Id. at 113.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 76-88.
39. Id. at51.
40. Id. at 70.
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pected federal authorities sufficiently intimidating, that the interviews
were inherently coercive. Most citizens and immigrants alike did not feel
free to refuse. Government authorities took great license in executing the
questioning, sometimes walking into a home, workplace or mosque to
question one person and taking names and extending interrogation to
everyone there.
The FBI and appropriate law enforcement agencies have not only
the right, but a responsibility to conduct appropriate investigation into
terrorism related activity. Discriminatory profiling, however, is neither a
legitimate investigative technique, nor is it a substitute for individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing. In determining who to interview, the govern-
ment neglected to exhibit any belief, reasonable or otherwise, that the
people it sought to question possessed relevant knowledge of criminal
activity. Religion and ethnicity were the only identifying factors. Fur-
thermore, many of the queries posed to those interrogated were not rele-
vant to questions that should be asked of suspects or potential witnesses
to crimes.
Subjects of the interviews reported that authorities often used inap-
propriate intimidation tactics, questionable methods of interrogation and
delved into inappropriate subject matters. People were asked questions
such as:
How religious of a Muslim are you?
How many times a day do you pray?
What mosque do you attend?
How do you feel about the war in Afghanistan? The war in Iraq?
What do you think of U.S. foreign policy?
How do you feel about Israel?
Name every Palestinian that you know. Name every Iraqi that you
know. 
4 1
All of the information collected during these interviews was put into a
searchable federal database.
After hearing of some of the interviews, where possible, the ACLU
started offering free legal representation for those targeted for interviews.
When subjects informed the FBI that an attorney would be representing
them at the interview, an interesting thing started to happen - many
agents lost interest and canceled the interview. When the agents' cancel-
lations developed into a pattern, some subjects did not tell the FBI that
41. Taken from internal ACLU debriefings of interviews (on file with author).
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they would be accompanied by an attorney and just showed up to the
interview with their lawyers. Any sort of legitimate questioning should
be able to take place in front of an attorney and yet, time and again, FBI
agents cut short the questioning and walked out or canceled the inter-
view, sometimes angrily. In one instance, an angry FBI agent told an
ACLU attorney that she had "wasted" his time. This worrying behavior,
on the part of federal officers, leads one to ask: What kind of questioning
does our government want to conduct if agents feel that they can't do it
in front of legal witnesses?
III. SPECIAL REGISTRATION
The harassment of Arabs and Muslims is not only carried out by
having federal agents go to them. In June of 2002, Ashcroft announced
the impending implementation of a program, the National Security En-
try-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which would have Arabs and
Muslims go to the government. 42 One of the most highly publicized as-
pects of the program is the "Special Call-In Registration" which required
male nationals from 25 Muslim countries and North Korea to submit to
INS offices for questioning, fingerprinting and photographing.43 The
DOJ allotted specific time periods of weeks during which non-
immigrants from these designated countries were required to comply.44
Those who did not appear at INS offices during the designated time pe-
riod would presumptively lose their status, become "illegal" and risk
criminal jail penalties.45
It appeared, however, that the government was more interested in
making Arabs and Muslims subject to deportation than securing addi-
tional registration information. The government provided no individual-
ized notice of the new requirements - no letters appeared mailboxes, no
phone calls made, and no press conference describing the requirements
held. Instead, the DOJ just issued an obscure notice published on the
federal registry so complicated that even attorneys experienced difficulty
46in sorting out its meaning. People who followed every infinitesimal rule
and detailed requirement since the moment they entered this country
went from good status to illegal status simply for not complying with a
requirement of which they had no knowledge. The program was publicly
42. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Attorney General Prepared Remarks on the National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm (last visited May 24, 2004) [hereinafter Ashcroft June
6, 2002, Press Conference].
43. National Immigration Law Center, DOJ Expands "Call-In" Special Registration, Grants
Extensions of the Registration Periods for All Groups, IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UPDATE (Feb. 21,




46. See, e.g., Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated Countries, 67
Fed. Reg. 67,766 (Nov. 6, 2002).
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offered as a tool to apprehend terrorists. 7 Yet, there is no terrorist who
will stand in line for hours to be fingerprinted, photographed and respond
honestly to questions like: "Are you a terrorist?"
Initially touted as a program that would register foreign visitors
from all nations, Ashcroft called an end to it as soon as most of the ma-
jority Muslim and Arab countries were registered. This came as no sur-
prise. The administration's meager protests failed to veil Special Regis-
tration as a discriminatory program to register Arabs and Muslim South
Asians. The entire initiative represents horrifying backpedaling into dis-
criminatory profiling. In the history of this country, indeed, in the history
of the world, subjecting people to special government regulations and
requirements on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity, is always looked
at in retrospect with extreme regret, shame and embarrassment. Not
once, have we looked back on an instance of this kind of profiling and
thought it was a good idea.
For many, the current period bears striking similarities to another
disgraceful period. In 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order
9066, giving the Secretary of War authority to intern over 110,000 Japa-
nese-Americans, two-thirds of whom were U.S. citizens.48 As a country,
we have since apologized, paid $20,000 to each survivor in reparations
and yet appear not to have learned the fundamental lesson of not repeat-
ing past mistakes. 49 The Japanese-American community, particularly
horrified at government policies singling out Arabs and Muslims for dis-
criminatory treatment, has voiced strong opposition to the discrimination
and solidarity with oppressed communities.
IV. WE ARE ALL AT RISK
Many people are complacent with some of the attacks on civil liber-
ties because they are seen as affecting religious and ethnic minorities, not
the average person. James Baldwin voiced a beautiful truth, "we live in
an age in which silence is not only criminal but suicidal .... For, if they
take you in the morning, they will be coming for us that night."5° Often,
laws destructing civil liberties start with the most marginalized in our
society and eventually effect us all. We saw the progression in the use of
the "enemy combatant" status, as defined by President George W. Bush,
which originally only applied to non-citizens, but soon thereafter applied
to U.S. citizens as well. First Yasser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen alleg-
47. Ashcroft June 6, 2002, Press Conference, supra note 42.
48. Exec. Order No. 9066: Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas, 7
Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
49. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903, 903 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989-1989d (2000)). A listed purpose of the statute is to "make
restitution to those individuals of Japanese ancestry who were interned." Id. at 903.
50. James Baldwin, An Open Letter to My Sister, Angela Davis, in IF THEY COME IN THE
MORNING: VOICES OF RESISTANCE 13 (Angela Yvonne Davis ed., 1971).
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edly captured in Afghanistan, 5' and then Jose Padilla, another U.S. citi-
zen arrested in Chicago's O'Hare airport.
5 2
Similarly, government scrutiny on America's airways is following
the same pattern. When government starts targeting people though cir-
cumstantial characteristics rather than criminally suspect behavior, it is a
short leap to encompassing increasingly wider groups of innocent people
in a web of undeserved suspicion.
The United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
recently announced plans to implement a program known as Computer
Assisted Passenger Prescreening Program II (CAPPS 11).53 This program
proposes to screen passenger profiles in order to identify national secu-
rity risks to America's airways. 54 It would require the submission of per-
sonal information, which would be checked against other private facts in
government and third party databases.55 It would apply to all of the peo-
ple who fly America's airways.56
In making travel reservations, airlines and travel agencies would
be required to collect the passenger's name, birth date, home phone
number and home address to create a Passenger Name Record (PNR).57
Included in the PNR are details such as the passenger's travel itinerary,
credit card information, hotel information, and emergency contact infor-
58mation. Some of the seemingly innocuous facts actually provide very
personal information that should have no bearing on a person's ability to
travel, but is easily subject to discriminatory scrutiny. For example, a
person's choice of Muslim or Kosher meal, included in the PNR,59 could
indicate their religion and lead to unfavorable ratings.
The information collected, forming the PNR, will be submitted to
both government and commercial databases which have data mined con-
sumers' private information from various resources such as driving re-
cords, credit reports, real estate transactions and voter registration infor-
51. See Brief for Petitioner, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (argu-
ing that detention of a United States citizen by the United States government as an enemy combatant
is unlawful).
52. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (United States citizen challenging
his detention by the United States government as an enemy combatant), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
1353 (2004).
53. Press Release, United States Transportation Security Administration, TSA's CAPPS 11
Gives Equal Weight to Privacy Security (Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?




56. See U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMrIrEES,
AVIATION SECURITY: COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM FACES
SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 2 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04385.pdf (last visited May 24, 2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
57. Id.
58. See id. at 6 n.8.
59. See id. at 5.
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mation.60 These companies will compare the information from the PNR
with information that they have in their databases. 61 Red flags will be
raised if any information does not exactly match.62 Think of how easily
this could happen. Anyone who has recently moved and has not yet up-
dated all of his or her credit companies, obtained a new driver's license,
or re-registered to vote will be marked as suspicious. Bias will attach
itself to those who have not established applicable records, resulting in
increased inspection of those with low incomes and young passengers -
all people whose conditions in no way reflect a threat to national secu-
rity.
The data mining companies return the results of their information in
the form of a score to the TSA.63 TSA enters the particulars into the
CAPPS II scheme resulting in a "threat level" for each traveler, assigning
each person a color: red, yellow or green.64 Red indicating that the per-
son is a national security threat and should not be permitted to fly; yel-
low indicating that the person is a potential risk requiring scrutiny and
investigation; green applying to those who pose little risk and are permit-
ted to fly. 65 The exact criteria by which the "risk level" will be deter-
mined are still secret and may never be revealed.66 Furthermore, once a
person is assigned a red or yellow, there is no procedure for him or her to
find out why that label was designated or how to remove themselves
from those lists.
67
For those who can afford it, the TSA intends to create a "trusted
traveler" program.68 Those who can and wish to participate would submit
to comprehensive scrutiny, pay a fee, and in exchange, TSA will issue
them an identification card which will allow them to bypass any extra
security checks at the airport.69 This leaves the airways vulnerable to
threats created via identity theft.
Although, for a period of time, Delta Airlines conducted a pilot pro-
gram for CAPPS II, it has not yet been officially implemented industry
wide.70 Congress indicated that CAPPS II would not be funded until the




64. American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Criticizes Plan to Go Forward with CAPPS I
Call Dragnet Profiling Approach Fake Security on the Cheap (Jan. 12, 2004), at http://www.
aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=14699&c=206 (last visited May 25, 2004) [hereinafter
ACLU Dragnet].
65. Id.
66. American Civil Liberties Union, The Five Problems with CAPPS 11: Why the Airline
Passenger Profiling Proposal Should Be Abandoned (Aug. 25, 2003), at http://www.aclu.org/
SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID= 13356&c=206 (last visited May 25, 2004).
67. Id.
68. ACLU Dragnet, supra note 64.
69. Id.
70. TSA Press Release, supra note 53.
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program passed eight specified criteria. The General Accounting Office
(GAO), Congresses "regulatory arm," released an assessment of the pro-
gram. According to the GAO, as of January 2004, the CAPPS II program
failed to meet all but one of the Congressional requirements for fund-
ing.71 TSA is unsuccessful in: sufficiently testing CAPPS II for efficacy
and accuracy; adequately assessing the accuracy of information in data-
bases used for CAPPS II; installing security measures to protect unau-
thorized access to travelers' personal data; establishing effective over-
sight of the system's use and operation; addressing privacy concerns; and
creating redress procedures for passengers to correct erroneous informa-
tion. While Congress has made clear their intention that the program
should not proceed without correcting these problems, President Bush
indicates that the stated requirements are merely advisory recommenda-
tions, not requirements necessitating fulfillment.
CONCLUSION
From sweeping arrests and detentions absent probable cause of
criminal activity, to FBI questioning and Special Registration without
individualized suspicion, to data-mining programs that invade the integ-
rity of our right to privacy without making us safer, we are quickly
changing as a nation. Targeting innocent immigrants is not the answer.
These and other measures do not make us safer as a country and they
destroy fundamental freedoms that have distinguished America. Almost
250 years ago, Benjamin Franklin said, "Those that give up essential
liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor
safety." There must be a response to terrorism, but the response must
recognize our ability to be both safe and free.
71. GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 4.
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How FAR HAVE WE COME SINCE SEPTEMBER 11TH,
2001?
SHAWN MITCHELLt
Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be with you. I have to juggle
part-time service in the legislature - that is full-time during the months
we are in session - with a law practice, and I spent the last few days
working around the clock on a couple of briefs. I mean literally around
the clock. - I slept last night from about 3:00 in the morning until about
4:30 in the morning. So if I seem a little off, I apologize in advance.
I was thinking about what I might say that would be worth the time
and attention of a group of studying legal scholars and teaching attor-
neys, and Brent put me at ease when he said, "Don't worry; if we wanted
anything too impressive, we wouldn't have invited a state representa-
tive." So I appreciate that. And I am impressed at the attendance you
have this afternoon, Friday afternoon, with all the precious time at Berk-
ley and before that at BYU, and you can imagine what the transition was
like from BYU undergrads to the Berkley law school.
As a graduate of a competitive law school, as a legislator; in other
words, as someone who is not an expert on the important issues that we
are considering here today, what I can offer you in this discussion, I
think, is someone who cares about these issues and who thinks about
them. I graduated fifteen years ago. And my exposure to criminal law or
criminal procedure since then has been about as regular and extensive as
maybe some of the third year students have experienced regular atten-
dance on Friday afternoon classes.
So what I offer you today is not the perspective of an expert. But in
a way I think that is fitting, because the most important discussions about
liberty that we have, and perhaps some of the most important weighing,
evaluating, and defending of liberty, probably should be conducted at a
level that is accessible to citizens who live it. To citizens who face most
of the criminal charges, who pursue opportunities in society, who look
for academic and economic freedom, who live their lives. This is unlike
some of the hard sciences, or even some of the social sciences, where
scholarly debate and esoteric discussion accomplishes something that is
intrinsically worthwhile.
t Colorado Representative and President of the Colorado Federalist Society, B.S., magna
cum laude, Brigham Young University, 1987; J.D., University of California at Berkeley, 1990. This
speech was originally presented at a symposium on March 5, 2004.
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I think when it comes to deciding whether or not liberty, freedom,
or our civil rights are adequately safeguarded, probably the most valu-
able discussions are the ones that are accessible to everyone that these
issues affect. So I am proud to be able to meet that standard with you
here today.
The topic that I was assigned is: How far have we come since Sep-
tember 11 th? I can reflect, and ask you to ask yourselves the same ques-
tion in a couple of different ways.
How far have we come since September 11 th in terms of combating
terrorism? Where are the terrorists? How successful are they in their
aims? What do we know about the answers to those questions? Where is
our society? Where are our standards? Where are our freedoms? Are they
largely respected? Have they significantly deteriorated? I have to admit
to being appalled by much of what I heard from the speaker before me. I
would like to follow up and learn a little bit more about some of the sto-
ries and information and anecdotes. But there are things perhaps happen-
ing that should not be happening. And yet - and yet.
I think these issues need to be put into a context. And let me step
back and try and put them into a context. I submit to you that the gov-
ernment's first duty is to promote the survival and safety of its citizens. I
submit to you that that is kind of the organizing principle that developed
early rudimentary governments, when settlers in the valley would band
together against marauding wolves, or against other tribes that would
come against them, or against whatever the threat was. It was largely an
economic effort, but probably even more for collective physical security.
I submit to you that in our society today, the way the government
protects us from harm and promotes our survival really has two different
faces. One is domestic. It is our civil and criminal justice system, the
issues it addresses, the threats it responds to, the penalties and sanctions
it imposes, and the activities it carries out. I would suggest that another
face of our government's effort to protect our survival and safety is the
national security, or the foreign threats. And I would submit to you they
present two - or at least historically we believe they present two - sub-
stantially different kinds of analysis and sets of issues to think about.
When you think about our civil justice system, and street crime, and
threats to civil order in that way, you might think of assault and battery.
You might think of robbery. You might think of corporate crime. You
might think of looted pension funds. You might think about the conse-
quences and the harm that those kinds of actions impose on society, and
the way we respond to them with a very painstakingly constructed civil
justice system, with presumptions of innocence, and with procedural
safeguards at many junctures along the way, which many people do not
even become aware of.
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Everyone knows what the Miranda rights are, but few people know
that there are equivalent principles to Miranda rights at several steps
along the way, any one of which can void an arrest, or conviction, or the
reliability of evidence admitted at trial. That is our criminal justice sys-
tem. The police that carry out its efforts at the ground level, that respond
to calls, that look for criminal suspects, that arrest people, that take them
in. It is all to respond to us and protect us, and in some measure track
down, and bring justice to [criminals], and in that sense we hope in fur-
therance of deterrents [that] protect us from current crime and from fu-
ture crime.
Now consider the threat coming from the other face of our govern-
ment's effort to promote our survival - national security. Foreign mili-
tary threats. We live in a large and powerful nation. We are not really
accustomed to thinking of an imminent military threat. However, consid-
ering the battlefield circumstances that our nation has found itself in, and
that fighting young men and woman have found themselves in, also con-
sider the mores, the standards, the safeguards, the values, and the as-
sumptions that make up the criminal and civil justice system. Then con-
trast that with life on the battlefield.
On the battlefield, it is not about due process, it is not about identi-
fying someone who did something wrong and bringing justice to them. In
general, it is about protecting against the threat. It should be about pro-
tecting against the threat.
The theory is, in many cases, not in all, but in many cases, that our
military is engaged because we believe the side that is coming, the side
that our military is engaging and is responding to, presents some threat to
us, or to our vital national interests. And when a soldier is on the battle-
field and bullets fly, he does not consider whether or not he has Fourth
Amendment probable cause to shoot back. He does not worry about
whether or not he has a warrant to go into the cave, or into the foxhole,
or around the comer. He responds to the threat, protects himself or her-
self; and, we hope, if leaders are choosing reasonable policies, through
accomplishing the objective, protects all of us, protects our vital inter-
ests, and protects against the threat.
Now, I am sure many of you would like to disagree with very much
of what I just said, but the time will come. However, I think you will
probably give me the distinction between how we respond to civil street
crime and how we respond to a military threat. Now, September 11 th
challenged those assumptions, of that clean dichotomy, in many of our
minds. We were exposed to a catastrophic event that killed not tens, not
hundreds, but thousands of people.
It was not about crime, in the sense of someone trying to steal
money. It was not about some kind of manageable rebellion, or antisocial
behavior from a subculture in our society. Terrorism was a direct chal-
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lenge, a very effectively carried out challenge. Carried out by a line of
thought, by a line of thinking and strain of thought, which has adherence
in many places around the globe. And what September 1 lth made some
Americans come face to face with, and start thinking about, was the kind
of threat that they used to associate with the military - jeopardy might
now be among us on our streets. How many of you, in the early hours of
September 11 th, would have bet five dollars that two days would go by
without there being another attack somewhere? How long did we wait
and hold our breath and wonder when it would hit?
The nature of the threat is changing, the nature of the threat that we
live with day to day on our streets may be changing. With the determina-
tion of whoever the bad actors are, with the skill and sophistication of
whoever the bad actors are, with the technology or ingenious strategy
they are willing to use making weapons of mass destruction.
Even though we did not find them in Iraq, does anyone doubt that
there are financed terrorist networks all over the globe, just desperately
trying to find chemical weapons, access to the right kind of plutonium, or
biological weapons? Does anyone take comfort in thinking that is not
happening right now? That there are arms bazaars and markets all over
the world? There probably are.
So, if the nature of the threat has changed, what should we think
about the nature of our response? Is the way that we traditionally respond
to "cop and robber" kinds of violations adequate to our protection if
someone is trying to do something diabolical? Trying to do something
that will kill hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands of people?
Do we need to take any different steps to identify, to respond, to contain,
and to apprehend the people that present those threats to us? And if so,
how much different should those steps be from police department, FBI,
and other traditional law enforcement investigation methods?
I would like to point out one more difference between traditional
police work and military work. I want to make one point - to illustrate
that one difference between what the military does and what the police,
prosecutors, and civil justice system do, is that the military is supposed to
be about protection, unless we are aggressing. It is supposed to be about
diffusing a threat.
It is much, much less interested in identifying specific culpable bad
actors, and imposing some kind of justice that is carefully calibrated and
measured out. It is about protecting us or our vital interests from threat,
and that protection function usually, or often, involves a lot less due
process than even in our local police force.
It is one thing for the police to be investigating a crime, because
then, of course, all civil liberties and protections apply. It is quite another
thing if there is a shootout on the street, you walk out your door, and you
are about to walk into the line of fire. I hope that cop hits me with a body
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blow that puts me down on the floor immediately. And that is not cruelty
or unjustified violence. That is taking whatever steps, appropriate to the
circumstances, to protect a citizen from the threat.
So now the question is, and I pose it to you again, do the threats that
we believe may be among us have any relevance, or have any decisive
effect, on the kinds of steps that we take to respond to them? Let's dis-
cuss it. I suggest that the answer is obviously yes. And the question then
becomes: What should those steps be? How do we identify our vital and
cherished liberties, and make sure that they are protected? How do we
ensure that we are responding appropriately and with adequate serious-
ness to threats that are different from a bank robber, or likewise, to depict
something heinous, a child molester? Let's talk about some of what we
have done. First of all, a lot of what Dahlia talked about had nothing to
do with the Patriot Act, or a formal legislative response. The arrests that
started immediately were not authorized by any new legislation. They
were executive branch policy to act under existing law. And you can
almost debate whether they acted faithfully to that law or not. But they
were not, and in large degree, still are not "shored up" or motivated by
the Patriot Act.
They were the executive branch's efforts to act with dispatch to pro-
tect our society, to protect against the threat. So when we got around to
passing legislation, it passed 98-0 and very quickly in the United States
Senate, and I do not recall what the vote in the United States House of
Representatives was, but it was almost as lopsided.
But what did we do? Most of your elected representatives did not
know what they were voting on.
What did we include in the anti-terror legislation? It is roundly con-
demned by national commentators, by radio personalities, and by people
at cocktail parties, who speak as if it was accepted that it was a vile intru-
sion into our civil liberties. If there are vigorous opponents to the Patriot
Act here today, I would like someone to tell me specifically, someone
tell me, particularly a student, what is wrong about the Patriot Act?
I bet you there are people here today that saw Federalist Society ad-
vertised and think I am a thug, and buy into the kind of "accepted wis-
dom" that the Patriot Act is just a wholesale abridgment of our civil lib-
erties. But I would like to hear someone to tell me anything that it does.
Q. (symposium attendee) If I understand correctly, if the govern-
ment is coming in to ask a judge for a warrant, they simply make the
claim that they are investigating a terrorist, and that judge has the discre-
tion in granting that warrant.
A. (Rep. Mitchell) That is not how I understand it. What I under-
stand is that whereas formerly if their concern was for terrorism, you
would have to meet a probable cause standard. Now it meets the FISA,
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or Foreign Intelligence Service Act standard, which is "reason to be-
lieve" or "reason to suspect." That is the lower end of the bar for gov-
ernment surveillance.
However, if that information is used for a protective function, rather
than for the prosecutorial function, then I feel better, I feel freer, I feel
more protected, knowing that someone does not have to go prove, to the
level of a civil case, that someone might be involved in dangerous activ-
ity before they can even take a peek and find out. I do not know about
you, but knowing the threats that are out there, I want the bar lowered if
the information is channeled into the protective function, and the re-
sponse, but not transferred to criminal prosecution.
Let us mention a couple of things the Patriot Act did do. In commu-
nication technology, it updated standard wiretap authority, and search
warrant authority. It used to be that when you got a warrant to track
someone, you had to get it to the particular communication device the
person used. Well, under the Patriot Act, you can get a warrant that fol-
lows the person from device to device.
Which, if you think about it, makes a lot more sense. Sophisticated
terrorist groups can dispose of three cellular phones a day, and just keep
cycling through new cellular phones. As a response, let us get a warrant
on a person, and try to follow those communications.
Another thing that the Patriot Act did was to update a search war-
rant that used to apply to telephones, and I think was called a pin trap
warrant, that would not let you monitor the content of conversations, but
would allow you to see phone numbers that were going in and out of the
phone. Well, we extended that concept to include many electronic de-
vices. Now, you can monitor the e-mail addresses going into and out of a
computer. If there is justification for a warrant that allows you to check
numbers going into and out of a phone, is there not equal justification for
a warrant that allows you to monitor e-mail addresses going into and out
of a computer?
One of the major differences that the anti-terrorist legislation made
was to increase communication between that security and protection side
of the government and domestic law enforcement. We have all heard the
anecdote about one of the September 11 th hijackers that wanted to learn
how to fly airplanes, but did not care to learn to land an airplane. That
information did find its way into the government's hands. But it never
crossed the gulf that it needed to cross, to be reasonably processed and
acted on. That is because of the restrictions we had in place before the
anti-terrorist legislation - restrictions that kept security and protection
personnel from talking to the law enforcement personnel.
I guess the topic that Professor Chemerinsky's discussion is going
to focus on is the loose definition of association, or support of terrorism
found in the Patriot Act. The point I want to make to you is that there are
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not very many broad, sweeping things that the Patriot Act does. There
are a lot of targeted, specific tools it provides to law enforcement.
There is another controversial provision within the Patriot Act -
Section 215, or the so-called "Library Amendment." Everyone hears
about the government snooping about what you are reading. Well, num-
ber one, as of whenever I last did research on that issue, there is no
known instance, not a single reported instance, of law enforcement using
Section 215. Is that changed?
(Prof. Chemerinsky) The University of Illinois, on their website, has
a survey showing that over one hundred fifty libraries had their records
subpoenaed under Section 215 of the Patriot Act.
(Rep. Mitchell) Thank you. Last time I looked there were none.
This ties pretty tightly to the Tattered Cover book store case that
was litigated here in Colorado about a year ago. And I just have to tell
you, as someone that is as jazzed about the First Amendment as the next
guy, I just do not think that the government's ability to look at a book, to
see if it provides evidence tying me to an illegal activity, has anything to
do with it chilling my speech.
First I am going to give you the argument that it does, then I am go-
ing to give you my argument that it does not. The argument that Section
215 has a chilling effect: If you look at a book that you know might be
subject to government surveillance or a subpoena, it would have a chill-
ing effect on what you read, so when you go to the library, or go to the
book store, you are going to feel the shadow of Big Brother looking over
your shoulder. And you might thus be chilled in the materials you read.
Fair enough, except the First Amendment is not just about books
and print, it is about speech, too. Our human medium of communication
is by and large speech. Government agents regularly try to find out about
the things you have said, to see if those things tie you specifically to a
crime. For example, when a government agent says, "Did you see the
defendant, ma'am?" And the woman replies, "Yes, I saw the defendant."
And the agent then asks, "What did he say?" Does anyone think that the
defendant's lawyer should jump up at trial and say, "Objection, Your
Honor - he is inquiring into my client's speech. If my client knew that
the things that came out of his mouth were subject to government
surveillance, that would chill his speech. And our Constitution, by gosh,
protects the principle of free and open expression. And you cannot im-
pose that chilling effect, so you cannot inquire into what my client said."
I think that is a pretty tight analogy. It makes no sense to me at all to
think that if the information in a book, or the information that came out
of your mouth were somehow relevant to tying you to criminal activity,
then the fact that relevance was sought out to be introduced as a chill on
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your freedom of expression by book or reading or speech in the first
place.
Because remember, when everyone says that it chills what you are
reading, what they are really talking about is the specter of government
censorship, and government somehow punishing you for what you are
reading, or government making your reading material illegal. That is the
farthest thing from a prosecutor's mind - he just wants to find out if you
have borrowed a book on methamphetamine labs at the Tattered Cover
book store.
Section 215 of the Patriot Act allows federal officers and law en-
forcement officials to subpoena records held by third parties, to see what
books or magazines they have read. And if anyone believes that is be-
cause they are putting together a censorship law, then we cannot have a
discussion. Rather, it is because they want to find out, from your reading
activities, if they can possibly tie you to a crime, and I do not see any
difference between that and inquiring into the words that come out of
your mouth, or the words that your ears catch coming out of someone
else's mouth. It is all speech. It is all human diction.
The point that I mean to make to you is that no matter how easy it is
to criticize massive sweeps and detentions, or join with everybody in
criticizing the Patriot Act, first, let us be specific and make sure that we
are really confident there are things that we think are worth criticizing.
Secondly, let us judge them in context. Do we face a different kind of
threat? Are we more aware of a different kind of threat than we were
before September 11 th? I submit that we are. I submit that what we have
done has been a measured, and by and large reasonably successful, effort
to respond to the threat, while at the same time protecting liberties, free-
doms, and traditional openness in society.
Are there abuses? Sure, there probably are some. I want to hear
more about some of the stories that Dahlia told. I disagree with some of
conclusions and broad assertions that she made. Let us talk about a cou-
ple of those. The response of our society to focus on Islamic extremism
is, to some extent, racial profiling - it is about the color of skin. The next
threat is not going to come from the Norwegian fishing team. We know
where the line of thinking comes from that wants to kill many Ameri-
cans, and I am sorry, but it is not coming from very many Nordic Euro-
peans. It is, by and large, young, angry men, from a handful of countries
in the Middle East. Also add in the Philippines and disaffected American
youth that are tapping into the terrorist network, and joining it. We know
that. It would be insane to ignore that fact.
Will that lead to some injustice? Will that lead to some people being
scrutinized when, number one, they are innocent, and number two, there
might not even be very good reason to scrutinize them? Probably so. Do
I feel bad about that? Yes, I do. Do I think there should be some civil
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remedies if someone can prove that they were harmfully impacted by
unreasonable government action? Yes, there should be.
But what would you do? You are George Bush, you have an Attor-
ney General, you have the FBI, you have the CIA, and one morning, ten
thousand Americans die. Dahlia wants you to keep doing traditional
criminal investigation, and wait until you see that someone has done
something that looks illegal. I just do not think that view is connected
with rationality.
When I say we know where the threat comes from, there is a his-
tory. Starting with the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983, fol-
lowed by the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanza-
nia, followed by the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and fol-
lowed by the USS Cole bombing in the Persian Gulf. On American soil,
before the USS Cole bombing, there was the World Trade Center bomb-
ing in 1993. After the USS Cole bombing, there was the devastating
mother of all attacks - on the World Trade Centers, the Pentagon, and
the plane in Pennsylvania on September 11 th of 2001.
It was not a broad, diverse coalition of people that put forth those
attacks. It was a very focused attack as far as nationality, ethnicity, and
religious motivation. That was where the threat came from. To pretend
otherwise is to read the Bill of Rights with a suicide bent.
The argument that a little bit, or even a lot, of increased scrutiny is
the same thing as internment - I just do not know what to say that. If you
are a person of Middle Eastern descent, you can go out and walk out on
the street today. If someone approaches you and is unkind or unfriendly
to you, I am sorry, they should not be.
If you get pulled over by a cop, or if there are some other kinds of
civil unpleasantness, it is still obscene to compare that to what happened
to Japanese Americans who were citizens for generations. Not just the
individuals were citizens, but their parents were citizens, and in some
cases, their grandparents were citizens. They owned land and property
that was confiscated. They were herded into camps, and everyone knew
it, and they were held there for years.
What is happening today is much, much, different. It is not the same
thing. Were there some people that were rounded up and swept into de-
tention for some time? Maybe for too long? Yes. Again, does that prick
our civic conscience? Yes. Should some of them be compensated? Yes.
Is it quite possible and reasonable to believe that those actions were car-
ried out in good faith by officials who were thinking of nothing more
than your safety and my safety? I argue yes.
Thank you for letting me be here with you today.
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POST 9/11 CIviL RIGHTS: ARE AMERICANS SACRIFICING
FREEDOM FOR SECURITY?
ERWIN CHEMERINSKYt
I'd like to talk this afternoon about how the worst aspects of Ameri-
can history have been repeating themselves. Throughout American his-
tory, whenever the United States has faced a threat, especially a foreign-
based threat, the response has been repression. In hindsight, however,
we come to realize that we weren't made any safer from the loss of
rights. I would like to begin by very quickly sketching this history, be-
cause I think you can only put what's occurred since September 11 th in
any context with this history in mind.
The history can start with the Alien Sedition Act of 1798.' In the
early years of this country, when survival of the republic was still in
doubt, Congress passed a law that made it a federal crime to falsely criti-
cize the government or government officials. The incompetent admini-
stration of John Adams used this to prosecute and convict political oppo-
nents. People went to prison for speech - the type of speech Jay Leno
and David Letterman use on a nightly basis.
Historians tell us that the country wasn't any safer for these prose-
cutions and convictions. Thomas Jefferson ran for president in 1800
partly on a platform that the Alien Sedition Act should be repealed, in-
cluding some of those who were convicted under it. Jefferson did that -
no court declared the Alien Sedition Act unconstitutional. In New York
Times v. Sullivan a in 1964, the Supreme Court declared the Alien Sedi-
tion Act unconstitutional for the first time in recorded history. It's a
wonderful metaphor - we can't hide that people went to prison for this
speech, and it didn't make the country any safer. During the Civil War,
President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, even
though the Constitution gives the president no such authority. Later, the
Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan3 declared this unconstitutional.
What's often forgotten is that hundreds, if not thousands, of people
were imprisoned in the Civil War just for their speech - criticizing the
way the North was fighting the war. Civil War historians will tell us that
the imprisonments did nothing to help the North win the Civil War; they
didn't make the country any safer.
f Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke Law School. This speech was originally presented
at a symposium on March 5, 2004.
1. 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
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In 1917 and 1918, during World War I, Congress adopted two stat-
utes making criticism of the draft and the war effort illegal. Those of
you who have studied First Amendment law have read Schenck v. United
States.4 In Schenck, a man circulated a leaflet that argued that the mili-
tary draft was unconstitutional as a form of involuntary servitude. There
wasn't a shred of evidence that his leaflet had the slightest backing.
There wasn't any proof that even a single person failed to report for in-
duction because of Schenck's leaflet. Nonetheless, he was convicted and
sentenced to ten years in prison for circulating that leaflet, and the Su-
preme Court upheld the conviction and sentence.
If you've taken First Amendment law, you've also read the case
concerning Eugene Debs, a socialist leader. In a speech to an audience
he said, "you are good for more than cannon fire. There's more that I'd
like to say but I can't for fear of imprisonment. ' 5 For saying that, Debs
was sentenced to ten years in prison. He ran for president while in
prison, and died soon after his release. Again, there's no evidence that
this made the country any safer.
During World War II, 120,000 Japanese-Americans, aliens and citi-
zens, and 70,000 war citizens were uprooted from their life-long homes
,,6and placed in what Franklin Roosevelt called "concentration camps.
Race alone determined who was free and who was put behind barbed
wire. The invasion of civil rights was enormous. It didn't do anything to
make the country safer. Not one Japanese-American was ever accused,
indicted, or convicted of espionage or any crime implicating national
security.
One more example: during the McCarthy era, many people lost their
jobs, and even their liberty, based on suspicion of being a Communist. It
truly was the age of suspicion. Professor Chen talked of this in terms of
forced patriotism. The reality is that people went to prison simply for
activities protected by the First Amendment.
Such is the case, again, those of you who study the First Amend-
ment, in Dennis v. United States.7 A group of people were prosecuted,
convicted and sentenced for organizing groups to study the works of
Marx, Lenin and Engels. Their crime under the Smith Act of 19408 was
conspiracy to advocate overthrowing the United States government.
They weren't being accused of conspiring to overthrow the government;
they weren't even being convicted of advocating to overthrow the gov-
4. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
5. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214 (1919) ("you need to know that you are fit for
something better than slavery and cannon fodder.").
6. See WILLIAM RAYMOND MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY OF AMERICA, 1932-1972, at 300 (1974).
7. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
8. 18 U.S.C. §2385 (2004).
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ernment. Their crime was conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the
government. There was no evidence whatsoever that their speech posed
the slightest threat to national security, however, the Supreme Court up-
held their 20-year prison sentences. Chief Justice Red Vincent wrote the
opinion for the Court. He said, "when the evil is so great as to overthrow
the United States government, there doesn't need to be any proof of in-
crease in likelihood." 9 Again, there was no proof; no evidence, that there
was any threat to national security. These individuals didn't pose any
harm to the country, and yet the Court upheld their sentences.
All of these examples should give us great pause before we take
away civil liberties in the name of national security. I am not the abso-
lutist - I do believe that there are times that rights have to be compro-
mised for security; but I believe before we take away liberties, we should
be really certain that it's really going to make us safer.
What I believe has gone on since September 11 th are unprecedented
actions by the government to take away civil liberties, and not in ways
that will make us any safer. I want to focus on three examples. The first
is the unprecedented claim of authority to detain individuals without ac-
cess to the courts. We'll start by talking about the Jose Padillal° case; it
might be familiar to you. Jose Padilla was arrested in Chicago's O'Hare
airport, now almost two years ago. He's an American citizen and his
alleged crime was planning to build and detonate a dirty bomb in the
United States. So as we talk about the Padilla case, it's important to re-
member that this was an American citizen arrested in the United States
for a crime allegedly planned in the United States.
Even though Padilla was arrested almost two years ago, to this mo-
ment no judge has ever issued a warrant for his arrest. No grand jury has
ever indicted him. No jury has ever convicted him. Instead, the Bush
Administration and the Ashcroft Justice Department, by labeling him an
enemy combatant, are holding Padilla indefinitely with no access to the
courts.
The Bush Administration and the Ashcroft Justice Department are
taking the position that the president has the authority to suspend the
Fourth, the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments. Now, if the framers of the
Constitution wanted to give such authority to the government to suspend
provisions, they would have said so expressly. Article 1, Section 9, for
example, says that Congress can suspend the writ of habeas corpus in
times of rebellion and insurrection.' The Fifth Amendment says that the
9. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516-17 ("Their conspiracy to organize the Communist Party and to
teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence
created a 'clear and present danger' of an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and vio-
lence.").
10. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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right to grand jury indictment can be suspended in certain circum-
stances. 12 But there's no clause anywhere in the Fourth Amendment, in
parts of the Fifth Amendment, or the Sixth Amendment that lets the ad-
ministration simply say, "if we designate somebody an enemy combat-
ant, we can hold that person forever."
I'm always skeptical of "framers' intent" arguments and it's very
difficult to know what the framers wanted; usually each side can muster
quotes from the framers to support their position. If there's any way the
framers' intent is clear, it's in the distrust of the executive power; that is
why the framers wanted to make sure that before somebody was arrested,
they're generally before a magistrate. That is also why they wanted to
make sure that there would be a grand jury indictment before somebody
was held.
In Padilla's case, he didn't have a grand jury. That is why the fram-
ers wanted to make sure that a jury of one's peers had to have proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt before somebody went to prison. And yet, the
Administration is taking the position that they can suspend all those pro-
visions just by labeling somebody an enemy combatant. This is a stop-
ping point to the Administration's argument. Why couldn't the prior
administration with this philosophy have designated a day in court for
those enemy combatants, and held them without trying them?
Now the argument is made that Padilla allegedly had ties to Al-
Queda, a foreign power. Does that mean that an administration can take
anybody who is accused in a drug case, say he allegedly has ties to Co-
lombian drug lords and designate that person as a enemy combatant in
the war on drugs? You should know the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in December 2003, ruled against the Bush Ad-
ministration, saying that he [the president] had no inherent power for the
statutory authority to detain a citizen as an enemy combatant.' 3 The Su-
preme Court, two weeks ago today, agreed to review the Padilla case and
will issue a decision by the end of June. 14
Another case of interest involved Yassir Hamdi. He's an American
citizen who was apprehended in Afghanistan and then brought to Guan-
tanamo. When it was discovered that he was a citizen, he was taken to a
military prison in South Carolina; he too has been designated an enemy
combatant.
These situations are identical to John Walker Lindh. John Walker
Lindh is also an American citizen, also apprehended in Afghanistan, and
also brought to Guantanamo, where it was known he was a citizen. The
only difference is that John Walker Lindh was charged with a crime and
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718 (2d Cir. 2003).
14. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2721-22, 2727 (dismissing the case on procedural grounds).
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pled guilty. In the case of Yassir Hamdi, however, the Bush Administra-
tion and the Ashcroft Justice Department are taking the position that they
can hold him forever as an enemy combatant. I wish the Bush Admini-
stration and the Ashcroft Justice Department would explain why they
chose to prosecute John Walker Lindh and why they chose to hold Yassir
Hamdi as an enemy combatant, because the only apparent difference is
that one is Anglo white and the other is of Arab descent. And of course,
it would be very disturbing if that is the reason these two individuals are
being treated differently.
[In Hamdi's case,] the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled that the government can detain a person indefinitely
as an enemy combatant; there shall be no judicial review. 15 The Supreme
Court however, granted a review of the decision; and a decision will be
coming down by the end of June.
16
One more example: since January of 2002, now about 26 months
ago, over 600 human beings have been held in solitary confinement in
Guantanamo. Until a week ago Tuesday, not one of them was ever
charged with any crime, neither a crime against foreign nations nor a
crime against the United States. There were two individuals who were
told they would be tried in military tribunals. The Administration is tak-
ing the position that it can hold these individuals indefinitely as enemy
combatants.
President Bush has said they can be held until the end of the war on
terrorism, which will go beyond any of our lives. What the United States
is doing here is a clear violation of an international law. The Third Ge-
neva Convention requires a hearing in a competent tribunal to determine
whether an individual is a prisoner of war and an enemy combatant.
The international covenants on civil and political rights say that all
individuals held by a government must be given access to the courts.
Even our staunchest allies, nations like Great Britain and Australia, are
condemning what the United States is doing in Guantanamo. The gov-
ernment's position is there can be no judicial review in any court of those
being held in Guantanamo. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia agreed with the Administration. 17  The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,' 8 in a case where I was co-
counsel, disagreed with the Administration's position, and now the Su-
preme Court is granting review of the DC Circuit decision to be decided
15. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), rev'g 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va.
2002).
16. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2642, 2650 (2004) (plurality opinion holding that
Hamdi's detention was authorized under the Authorization of Use of Military Force Act passed after
September 1 th, and that even though his detention was authorized by law, Hamdi was still entitled
to due process).
17. Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
18. Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003).
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again in June.' 9 The argument is not that those held in Guantanamo have
to have [an] Article III Federal Court [review] their claim, but it is to say
that before a human being is imprisoned indefinitely, there has to be the
opportunity for some review in some tribunal.
Dalia, a previous speaker, talked about many other individuals who
are detained for uncertain, sometimes long, periods of time solely on the
basis of their race. You know, in all of American history, no other presi-
dent, no other attorney general, has claimed the authority to hold people
as enemy combatants for indefinite periods of time. Even during World
War II, when German saboteurs came into the United States, they were
tried in military tribunals. It was never planned they be held indefinitely
with no trial.
The second example that I wanted to point to is the unprecedented
claims of secrecy asserted by the Bush Administration and the Ashcroft
Justice Department. I have a simple question - and maybe Representa-
tive Mitchell will answer it - how many people are now being held by
the federal government or have been held by the federal government
since September 11 th as part of the war on terrorism? I predict that no
one in this room can answer that question, because the Administration
refuses to tell us.
Immediately after September 11 th, they told us that some categories
of both are detained. In this moment in time, they've never told us how
many individuals have been held, or are now being held, as material wit-
nesses. I debated this issue a year ago against Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Michael Chertoff. Now he's a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals in the Third Circuit.20 I asked this question: "It's really simple -
tell us how many people you have held, or are now holding, as part of the
war on terrorism?" He said, "I can't tell you - that's national security
information." So, I'm really simple sometimes. I asked, "Can you ex-
plain to me how it jeopardizes national security to discuss whether it's
50, 500, 5,000, 50,000?" He said, "I just can't tell you that information."
I don't understand why the Administration won't tell us how many
people have been or are now being held. The Center for National Secu-
rity Studies brought a lawsuit seeking that information. The federal Dis-
trict Court in Washington DC decided that the Freedom of Information
Act requires that the information should be disclosed - the names of
those who are detained as well as the names of their lawyers. The United
States Court of Appeals and the District of Columbia Circuit,2' in a 2-1
decision, reversed explaining that in this time of crisis there has to be
19. Bush v. Gherebi, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (remanding case back to the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals to be decided in light of Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004)).
20. In January 2005, President Bush nominated Michael Chertoff to be Secretary of Home-
land Security.
21. Cent. For Nat'l Security Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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great deference given to the administration. In January, the United States
Supreme Court denied review of the case, so we still may not find out
how many people are being held by the federal government.
Those being held as material witnesses are particularly troubling
because the federal material witness statute requires that in order to hold
somebody as a material witness, it has to be shown that they have essen-
tial testimony that can't be gained in any other way, without a substantial
risk of life. It's apparent, from what we're learning, that many individu-
als are being held as material witnesses without meeting these require-
ments.
In terms of secrecy, there are many other aspects that are very dis-
turbing. One thing that I have had the pleasure to do every spring is
speak at the National Conference of Federal Public Defenders. When I
was in Philadelphia two years ago, a federal public defender from Miami
came and said, "I can't tell you very much about this, there's a gag order,
but what we're seeing now in our federal courts are completely secret
criminal prosecutions." And he says, "These are criminal prosecutions
that appear on no docket sheet, no one is allowed in except for the law-
yers; they're covered by a gag order that keeps them from discussing it
with anyone, and then the appeals are held in secret in the Federal Court
of Appeals."
I'm starting to hear about this from other people as well. In fact, the
legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, Steve Shapiro, sent
a letter to the Chief Judge for the Southern District of New York, Judge
[Michael B.] Mukasey, and said "we understand that these are secret
criminal trials." Judge Mukasey responded, and I quote almost verbatim,
"Unfortunately, or should I say fortunately, I cannot answer your ques-
tion."
In November of 2003, this all came to light when a cert petition was
filed in the United States Supreme Court in one of these cases. It was an
individual whose cert petition alleged that he was tried and convicted in
secret, his appeal was handled in secret and there's no record of it. He
argued that this violated the Constitution. Much of this cert petition was
redacted; that is, it was whited out, but there was still a good deal that
you could read, just by going on Westlaw or the Internet. The United
States filed its opposition to cert entirely under seal, so we can't see any
of it, and the Supreme Court last month denied review of the case. The
idea of totally secret proceedings is very chilling to me. There is no ac-
countability when it is done entirely in secret. To me, totally secret pro-
ceedings are reminiscent of the Star Chambers in the middle ages.
Another example of secrecy is a memo that was issued in Septem-
ber 2001 by the [Chief United States] Immigration Judge, Michael J.
Creppy; he called for blanket secrecy immigration pursuits. Now, this
too was total secrecy. It was a situation where no one was allowed ac-
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cess to the person, except for maybe a lawyer. All people present were
covered by a gag order - and there is no mention on any docket sheet. A
challenge was brought by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in a case called Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, and the
Sixth Circuit ruled that blanket secrecy in these immigration proceedings
violated the First Amendment. In an eloquent opinion, the court talked
about how democracy dies in secret. Blanket secrecy is inimical of the
principles of the First Amendment.
One more example of secrecy involves the fact that the federal gov-
ernment chose to house many detainees in state prisons. It turns out that
many states have laws that forbid secret detentions. The federal govern-
ment chose to house these detainees in New Jersey state prisons, but
New Jersey has a law prohibiting secret arrests and detentions. Also, the
Freedom of Information Act provides that information is accessible for
anyone being held in a New Jersey prison. A Freedom of Information
Act request was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in New Jer-
sey in order to get the identity of all of those who were being held as
detainees in the New Jersey prisons.2 3 A state trial court for New Jersey
ruled the information could be released under the clear dictates of New
Jersey law.
The federal government then adopted a regulation that said any state
that holds federal detainees is prohibited from disclosing the identity of
the detainees through their state law. The New Jersey Court of Appeals
then said New Jersey law had been pre-empted by federal regulation, so
the information couldn't be disclosed. Again, what's the interest in such
blanket secrecy? As Judge Keith said to the Sixth Circuit, "if there's any
need for secrecy in a particular case, let the government explain it, but
blanket secrecy undermines any checks and balances, any accountabil-
ity.' 24
The third example that I want to talk about is the unprecedented in-
vasions of the right to privacy, and here I do want to talk about the Pa-
triot Act.25 As you might guess, I have a very different take on it than
22. 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
23. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that news-
paper consortium did not have a First Amendment right to access to deportation hearings involving
persons suspected of having connections to September l1th. The ruling overturned the District
Court for New Jersey which initially granted the newspaper publisher's motion for preliminary
injunction. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002).
24. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683.
The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people's fives, outside the public eye, and behind a
closed door. Democracies die behind closed doors. The First Amendment, through a
free press, protects the people's right to know that their government acts fairly, lawfully,
and accurately in deportation proceedings. When government begins closing doors, it se-
lectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people.
Id.
25. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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Representative Mitchell. We should talk a little bit about how the law
was adopted, something that hasn't been mentioned here today.
Not long after September l1th, on a Monday, Attorney General
Ashcroft went before the Senate Judiciary Committee and presented a
long laundry list of proposals, almost all of which had been previously
been advanced and rejected by Congress. Many of these provisions were
imposed by the Clinton Administration in 1996 after the Oklahoma City
bombing as part of what came to be called the "Anti-Terrorism Effective
Death Penalty Act" of 1996.26 It was rejected by the Republican Con-
gress as too much of an invasion of privacy.
I think Representative Mitchell conceded this when he said that a lot
of these provisions were law enforcement's desires to get more power
and take advantage of September 11 th. In fact, after Attorney General
Ashcroft spoke to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the representatives of
the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle Association
criticized many of the proposals. It's not that often that the ACLU and
the NRA agree on things.
Two days later, Attorney General Ashcroft went before the House
Judiciary Committee and asked for basically the same list of proposals.
There were secret negotiations between representatives from the Con-
gress and the White House. They were going to produce two versions of
the Patriot Act. The Senate version passed with ninety-eight votes. The
House version passed overwhelmingly. No hearing was held in any
committee of Congress regarding the Patriot Act. I can't think of any
other major piece of legislation that was passed without any hearing.
When Senator Feingold objected on that basis, Senator Orrin Hatch of
Utah said, "We're in a crisis, we don't have time to hold hearings." To
me, the idea that we could adopt a law that has provisions that signifi-
cantly affect us without even holding a hearing is quite disturbing.
Well, Representative Mitchell asked any of us to come up with pro-
visions that we find disturbing, and I think the first thing to do is exactly
that. The definition of terrorism under the Patriot Act has two parts -
first, there must be a violation of a federal law, and it lists a long number
of federal statutes, and second, the act has to be "an act to intimidate or
,,27coerce the government or civilian populations. That's the exact lan-
guage of the law - "intimidate or coerce the government or civilian
populations." If you think about it, most crimes are about intimidating or
coercing somebody - bank robbery certainly fits under that. Kidnapping
certainly fits under that. In fact, an audience member gave the example
of a protest. If somebody intentionally threw a rock through a window in
a federal building, that would be a terrorist act under the Patriot Act be-
26. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
27. Patriot Act § 802.
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cause they've intentionally destroyed federal property - that's one of the
federal crimes that's listed - and they did it as part of a protest to intimi-
date or coerce the government or civilian populations. It's an enor-
mously broad definition. Representative Mitchell, you and I agree that
the reality is that when giving law enforcement broad powers, they will
use them.
Another example is a boy found in a car in Orange County, Califor-
nia, with a pipe bomb. He wasn't engaging in anything that we call ter-
rorist activity, but the government used all of its powers under the Patriot
Act. You might have read a little more than a month ago that the United
States Attorney in Des Moines, Iowa, subpoenaed Drake University for
records of those who participated in anti-war protests. Thankfully, the
public outcry against this helped the attorney decide to dismiss those
subpoenas.
Representative Mitchell is correct - the RICO Act28 shows us that
when government has broad powers, it will use them. Well, that's just
one more set of powers that are disturbing. Traditionally, going back not
that long ago in American history, there were two models in terms of
surveillance. One is what the government could do in foreign countries
and the other is what law enforcement could do in the United States.
When the CIA operated in a foreign country it wasn't constrained by the
Constitution, but when law enforcement operated in the United States, it
was constrained by the Constitution. Law enforcement, for example,
says you have to get a warrant, issued by a judge, before there would
ever be electronic eavesdropping. In 1972, in a case called the United
States v. United States District Court,29 the Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the contention of President Richard Nixon that he could engage
in warrantless wiretapping for national security in the United States. The
Supreme Court emphasized this distinction between law enforcement in
the United States and what was going on in a foreign country.
In 1978, Congress created a third category, called the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act.30 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
provided that if the purpose of the federal government is gaining infor-
mation about foreign intelligence, then it can meet a lower standard, not
the probable cause standard or the reasonable suspicion standard. Under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, courts can grant warrants for
wiretapping on much less evidence than usual.
The United States Supreme Court has never considered whether it is
constitutional, but the Ninth Circuit, like several other circuits, say it is
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2003).
29. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
30. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1811
(2000)).
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constitutional because the information would not be used for law en-
forcement purposes; it would just be used for intelligence purposes.
Indeed, it was often said that the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control
Act 3' that regulates wiretapping under the Fourth Amendment was a high
wall between intelligence and law enforcement. What the Patriot Act
does is obliterate that wall. The Patriot Act says that so long as the pur-
pose is intelligence gathering, even though the real primary purpose is
law enforcement, the government can take advantage of all the additional
powers that it gets under the Patriot Act and under the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act. In other words, so long as the government can
say, goal "A" is intelligence gathering, but goal "B" is domestic law en-
forcement, they could not get a warrant based on this lesser standard of
reasonable suspicion. They can take advantage of all the additional pow-
ers in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
So now, no longer do we have two or three models. Now, basically,
law enforcement can circumvent the Fourth Amendment, circumvent
statutory restrictions, and go to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
court. Studies have shown that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
court grants the government's request for warrants in 99.99% of all the
cases; there's basically no check of the government at all.
For example, under the Patriot Act, the government is allowed to
find what email addresses a person writes to or receives from, what web-
sites a person visits by showing that it is relevant to a criminal investiga-
tion. That is enough probable cause. Not even a reasonable suspicion -
it's just relevant to a criminal investigation, and it doesn't have to be a
criminal investigation even of that person.
The defense that is offered, as Representative Mitchell presents it, is
that the government has already had this power to find out what phone
numbers a person dials and receives from, under traps and traces. I
would object to that - and even granting that, there's a real difference
here. A trap or trace tells you the phone number; it doesn't tell you con-
tent. Finding out what websites a person is visiting does tell you content.
The reality of it is, you can often learn about a person by finding out
what websites a person is visiting. Think about health information, be-
cause people go on the web to learn about medical conditions. Some-
times you find inaccurate things as you stumble on the websites that
we've been to visit; I'm sure we've all had that experience.
Another example of a very disturbing provision of the Patriot Act is
the authority for so-called "roving wiretaps." Representative Mitchell
said it used to be, as long as wiretaps existed, that the government would
have to list the numbers that it wanted to tap. With roving wiretaps, they
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2004).
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can listen to any phone that the suspect reasonably might use. That
means that for a roving wiretap for Erwin Chemerinsky, they could listen
to all of the phones in the building where I work, all of the phones in the
stores where I shop, all of the phones at my friends' houses that I visit,
and here today, all of the phones in this building.
Last year when I debated an FBI agent, he said, "Yeah, with a rov-
ing wiretap we can listen to pay phones that you walk in front of on a
daily basis." The question is do we need to do this to make everything
safer? The threat to our privacy is potentially enormous here. With
enough roving wiretaps, the government could listen to any phone any-
time they want. Well, the Attorney General's argument, as Representa-
tive Mitchell presented it today, is that terrorists quickly change cell
phones. The problem with that argument is that the police can't listen to
a new cell phone until they know that it exists. By definition, if a terror-
ist has a new cell phone, the police can't tap it, even under a roving wire-
tap, until they know that it's there. And once they know that it exists,
they can then just add it to the existing warrant. When I raised this in
debate after debate, the response always was "Well, it takes too long to
add new numbers to existing warrants." But of course, all that calls for is
a more expeditious procedure for adding new numbers to existing war-
rants; it doesn't justify roving wiretap warrants.
In January 2002, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer went be-
fore the California legislature and said they needed roving wiretap au-
thority for the state and local police. I was thrilled when the District
Attorney in Los Angeles County, a Republican, not by any means a lib-
eral, said, "just create a procedure where we can quickly add a new num-
ber to an existing warrant." And the California legislature went in that
direction.
Another provision of the Patriot Act is Section 215 that allows a
court to order a subpoena from any records about a person, including
library records, bookstore records, creditor records. One thing that
wasn't mentioned by Representative Mitchell is that under such an order
the institution disclosing to the government cannot reveal to the individ-
ual that disclosure was made. So if the government requests my library
records, the library is prohibited by law to tell me. The standard here is
not probable cause; it's not even reasonable suspicion. The standard is
relevant to a criminal investigation.
Here, I profoundly disagree with Representative Mitchell. I think
that people will be cautious in the books that they read, the books they
buy or check out from the library, because they're afraid that the gov-
ernment's going to be monitoring them. Representative Mitchell says,
"We speak even though our speech might be used against us, so why
would that change what we read, if that can be used against us?" Well, I
assume that when I'm having a private conversation that it's not going to
be monitored by anybody else. And in fact, if the government wants to
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monitor my private conversation by wiretapping, they better get a war-
rant based on probable cause, unless they fit under the new provisions of
the Patriot Act.
But the government is allowed to find out what books I'm reading
just because it's relevant to some criminal investigation. As I mentioned,
a university did a survey of libraries in this country - and concluded that
there were 150 libraries that had their records subpoenaed pursuant to the
provisions of the Patriot Act. I'm skeptical as to how much it helps law
enforcement to know what books a person is reading. But I'm not at all
skeptical that it's going to be the effect of knowing what really is a form
of personal activity.
Another provision of the Patriot Act that is troubling is a clause that
says that the government can detain a non-citizen for seven days if
there's reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is assisting in
terrorist activity. That is not probable cause; that is an arrest for seven
days based on reasonable suspicion. This directly conflicts with Su-
preme Court precedence in two ways: first, the Supreme Court has never
upheld arrests on less than probable cause. And second, the Supreme
Court has said that a person has to be arraigned within 48 hours; this is
seven days. Another provision of the Patriot Act allows indefinite deten-
tions in certain circumstances, even though the United States Supreme
Court in Zadvydas v. Davis32 said that indefinite detention of non-
political aliens isn't permissible.
Another provision of the Patriot Act makes it a federal crime to as-
sist terrorist activity. Well, the provision specifically says "it's a federal
crime to give expert assistance to terrorist activity." Remember how
broad the definition of terrorism is? A Federal District Court in Los An-
geles in January declared that it is unconstitutional on the grounds of
overbreadth and vagueness.
The government is taking the position that it doesn't have to prove
that a person knew that it was a terrorist organization to have criminal
liability. The government says that all they have to prove is the person
knowingly gave to the organization, and if the government can prove that
it's a terrorist organization, that's enough for a conviction. So somebody
gave to what they thought was a humanitarian organization, not knowing
the government had designated it as a terrorist organization - that would
be a sufficient basis for a conviction. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit has declared that government position uncon-
stitutional, and for obvious reasons.
Again, I think that there are instances where the government needs
additional powers. I have no objection, for instance, to the government
32. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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doing more careful screening through the airports, even though there's a
lessening of privacy. But my problem with the provisions of the Patriot
Act is that they don't make us any safer. That's why that at this point,
over 250 cities have adopted resolutions criticizing the Patriot Act. A
week ago yesterday, the Dallas City Council adopted a resolution criti-
cizing the Patriot Act. Now, I don't know a lot about the politics in Dal-
las - my guess is it's not a particularly liberal body. This is a form of
grassroots activism that you haven't seen in a long time in American
history, and I hope it will have some effect on the worst provisions of the
Patriot Act, which will subsequently expire in December 2005 and, hope-
fully, not be renewed.
I was not planning on talking about racial profiling, but I wanted to
say a word in response to what Representative Mitchell said. Now, what
he leaves out are the consequences for using race. We can certainly de-
bate whether the screening of somebody's luggage, using race as a rea-
son, is appropriate. I'm very disturbed by that for reasons that I'll ex-
plain - I don't think it's effective law enforcement and it's certainly
over- and under-inclusive. It's enormously humiliating to those who are
subjected to it. Individuals were being arrested and detained solely be-
cause of race, and that it is truly unconscionable for the government to do
so.
Now as I said a moment ago, one reason I object to racial profiling
is because I think it's terribly ineffective as a law enforcement tool. It is
so under-inclusive and so over-inclusive. It's under-inclusive because
the reality is many can pose as a terrorist who don't fit any profile. For
example, think in terms of McVeigh/Nichols - I remember after the
Oklahoma City bombing one of the first groups people suspected were
middle-Eastern terrorists. Of course, we now know the bombing was by
a militia group in the United States. On the other hand, racial profiling is
horribly over-inclusive. Think of all of the individuals of Arab-Middle
Eastern descent who will be harassed, detained, solely because of race,
and pose no threat whatsoever. Race alone can never be the basis for law
enforcement action; it was George W. Bush, as a candidate in one of the
presidential debates, who said exactly that in the fall of 2000.
I conclude with two quotes from late Supreme Court Justices. One
came from Robert Jackson, who said, "The Constitution is not a suicide
pact. '33 Of course, he's right. If there is a need to lessen liberties, we
need to be sure that it is really going to make us safer.
The other quote came from the late Justice Louis Brandeis. He said,
"The greatest threat to liberty will come from people who claim to be
33. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("There is a danger
that, if the court does not temper its doctrinaric logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert
the Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
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acting for beneficial purposes. 34 He said that "people born to freedom
know to resist the tyranny of despots," [and that] "The insidious threat to
liberty will come from well-meaning people with zeal, with little under-
standing of what the Constitution is about., 35 No, Louis Brandeis never
knew John Ashcroft, but if he had, he couldn't have picked better words
to describe him.
34. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
[Eixperience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the govern-
ment's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion
of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.
Id.
35. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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